

**ARMED FORCES OF THE PHILIPPINES  
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Commandant's Paper

**TOWARDS A RESPONSIVE EDUCATION AND  
SKILLS TRAINING PROGRAM IN  
PREPARATION FOR PN MODERNIZATION**

Submitted by

**CAPT ALBERTO R ARAOJO PN(GSC)  
JCSC Class Number 6  
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## ENDORSEMENT SHEET

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation in the regular course Class Number 6 of the Armed Forces of the Philippines Joint Command and Staff College, this Commandant's paper titled "TOWARDS A RESPONSIVE EDUCATION AND TRAINING PROGRAM IN PREPARATION FOR PN MODERNIZATION" has been prepared and submitted by CAPTAIN ALBERTO R ARAOJO PN(GSC), the acceptance of which is hereby strongly indorsed.

Prof. Abet Mamacotao MNSA  
Vice President, Pamantasan Ng  
Lungsod Ng Makati  
Adviser

## **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

This study sought to determine the causes of the steady decline of knowledge and skills of PN personnel. It focuses on the Education and Training System of the Philippine Navy. The study was conducted in order to formulate a responsive and relevant Education and Training System that will suite and met the PN training requirements for the upcoming AFP modernization. Purposive sampling survey was conducted among 54 active field-grade officers using a five-page questionnaire.

Initial findings of the study during the documentary analysis and interviews, revealed that indeed, the existing PN Education and Training System was the main cause of the progressive deterioration of PN personnel's knowledge and skills. Training programs and curriculum being conducted at the main training institutions of the Philippine Navy were still the same as what the author had taken twenty-six (26) years ago when he joined the Navy. Worst, many of the training aids and facilities were already gone and never replaced nor modernized. As a result, the knowledge and skills gained by both the officers and enlisted men were designed only to operate and maintain World War II vintage navy ships.

Respondents were so honest to accept that even the fundamental and very basic concept of the different aspects of naval warfare are completely an alien to them except for those who have undergone schooling abroad. Giving them a simple test as part of the questionnaire did this. They were requested to rate how far they know or have remembered certain things in modern naval warfare. The 30 items given were basic equipment or activity that are very familiar for anyone who

knows the very basics of modern naval warfare. As a whole the survey provided a revealing insight on the capability of our field-grade officers.

Taking into account that we have the most antiquated ships in Asia coupled with it the personnel's obsolete knowledge and skills we really have to forget about external defense. This sad state of affairs was the result of misdirected training goals and objectives perpetrated by some navy leaders for the past two and a half decades. Due to the numerous internal problems that beset our country and the obsolescence of our aging fleet, PN training institutions discontinued conducting naval warfare related courses. Fleet exercises were limited to basic tactical maneuvers, allied tactical procedures and communications, shipboard evolutions and shipboard administrations. This explains why the Philippine Navy's capability is now just limited to internal security operations, maritime law enforcement, sealift support to ground troops and civilian government agencies, search and rescue and naval gunfire support.

As one of the instrument to national power, the Philippine Navy under the new leadership of Rear Admiral Guillermo G. Wong AFP is now launching an aggressive and wholesome approach to Human Resource Development as part of the 15-Year Human Resource Development Strategy whose objective is to address some problems identified by this study. Since the said strategy is still under finalization, the author is also coordinating with the Office of N-5 to hopefully integrate the other recommendations of this study. However, the main product of this study, which is a revised PN Education and Training Manual, will be submitted to N-8 for possible promulgation of the FOIC, PN.

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ALBERTO R ARAOJO  
CAPT PN(GSC)

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# Chapter 1

## The Problem and Its Setting

### Introduction

The naval profession is a highly technical service. Knowledge and skills in using the latest state-of-the-art technology defines winning or losing a war. Both knowledge and skills are acquired only through constant training and continuing education amidst the background of a fast changing technology.

Modern naval warfare today is heavily dependent on the effective ranges of sensors and weapons, which most of the time are way behind the horizon. This is the wisdom of the missile system. Adversaries no longer see each other eye to eye. This is called “beyond the horizon targeting”. Protagonists only see each other through the radar. He whose radar has the farthest effective range will surely be the first to see his adversary. In the words of Col. Victor N. Corpuz PA(GSC), during his lecture before the JCSC Class No. 6 last 20 August 2000 about Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), he repeatedly emphasized the statement, “**when the enemy sees you, you are dead**”. Such statement is extremely accurate specially if Col. Corpuz is addressing the statement to the Philippine Navy.

It is for this reason that ship-based rotary aircraft (as well as carrier-based fixed-winged aircraft) are considered an integral part of a modern warship because they serve as an extension of the ship’s sensors using the LINK system. These aircraft if equipped with radar, LINK system and other

sensors, are now called as “airborne CIC”. Electronic signal from radar travels in a straight line. Its effective range is restricted only if blocked by the horizon created by the earth’s surface curvature. So if it is carried on board the aircraft, its effective range also increases and the gathered data are transmitted to its mother ship using the LINK system and the latest technology called “burst transmission”.

Eight and a half years ago, it was no less than the Flag-Officer-In-Command, Philippine Navy, Rear Admiral Mariano J. Dumancas AFP who made a similar comment when he made a honest-to-goodness assessment of our naval capabilities. His stark assessment runs like this, **“should the Chinese or Vietnamese naval forces seize the Spratley Islands, the PN ships may not even reach the scene of battle in the South China Sea. They can fire their missiles even before we can see them on radar and we may never know what hit us”**.<sup>1</sup> Many people would probably say that the FOIC was so pessimistic against the very organization that he leads. But that was the most candid, accurate and realistic assessment of our navy’s capabilities. The FOIC will be committing a grave sin not only before the eyes of God but also towards the Filipino people if he will continue to lie and pretend that the Philippine Navy is capable of defending our country against external threats.

Above comment of the FOIC was made after a six-day fleet exercise dubbed “Pagpapalakas 92-1” conducted in the first week of March 1992 and held at the Visayan and Mindanao waters with fourteen (14) Philippine Navy

ships participating. The media who were present at that time were likewise concise and candid in their comments. Thus, **“It is ironic that for a country surrounded by waters, the Philippines has the worst equipped navy in the world. If not for the recent war exercise, the navy’s antiquated war fleet would not have been exposed. But one thing going for our navy is that it has officers and men still willing to fight for the country with guns that do not fire and ships that conk out every so often.”**<sup>2</sup>

Thanks to the media for citing our bravery in putting our lives inside those so-called ***floating coffins***. The present inventory of our fleet that consists mostly of World War II vintage ships are also considered as ***sitting ducks*** if pitted against modern navies of the world. But bravery is just one important factor in modern warfare. For me, possession of the latest state-of-the-art technology coupled with the knowledge and skill on how to use it, is everything in fighting modern wars or deterring external threat. The acquisition of such knowledge and skill is the product of a broad and complicated endeavor called Human Resource Development.

Continuing education and skills training on modern technology must be the vocation of both officers and men of the navy during peacetime. Unfortunately, the navy leadership has several priorities. The improvement, updating or modernizing of the navy’s education and skills training is apparently at the bottom of the navy’s priority list despite the fact that the sorry state of our navy has been the cause of concern of both the civilian and military leadership for the past two decades.

## **Background of the Study**

When Hong Kong was turned-over to Mainland China in 1997, the Philippines was able to procure three Peacock Class Patrol Vessels (PCPV) at a friendship price from the Hong Kong Squadron of the British Royal Navy. Although the Philippine Navy initiated the deal, it was not included in the PN Operating Program and Budget. Hence, its British crew haphazardly conducted the necessary training of both PN officers and enlisted men assigned to man the three ships.

These three former British ships became the most modern ships in the Philippine Fleet although they are relatively obsolete compared to the standards of the most modern navies around the world. The ships are not yet equipped with the missile system and an airborne CIC that would extend the effective ranges of its sensors and weapons beyond the horizon. Its main armament is 76-millimeter Otto-Melara gun equipped with fire-control radar and auto-reloading system. One man stationed at the console of the fire-control radar is enough to operate and control the gun. All he had to do is just lock the fire-control radar on the target and push the button to fire the gun; then the gun will always point to the target wherever it goes even if the ship is rolling or pitching due to big waves. Unlike a similar armament aboard a World War II vintage ship, guns are manually loaded with ammunition then manually point, train and fire the gun to the target by a seven-man gun crew. The Otto-Melara gun could fire about 30 times (or more) faster than manually loaded

gun depending on the speed and teamwork of the gun crew. The real advantage here is the speed and accuracy of the Otto-Melara guns.

When one of the Otto-Melara guns encountered derangement one year after its acquisition, not a single person in the Philippine Navy knows how to put the gun back into operating condition. The Philippine Navy requested Australia to train PN personnel in conducting repair on such type of guns. When Australia acceded, the PN sent personnel with a rating of gunner's mate to undergo the training. However, these gunner's mates were sent back to the Philippines because they don't know anything about electronics on which Otto-Melara guns operates. So, the PN sent another batch of personnel with a rating of electronic technicians instead. The training lasted for two years then that will be the only time that the guns has been repaired<sup>3</sup>.

Due to this incident, the PN was awakened and made aware on the state of readiness of our personnel towards modernization. The problem was only about the repair of a gun commonly used around the world yet it gave an enormous headache to the PN. How much more if the problem was about missile system and electronic countermeasure equipment? Maintenance and repair is a small portion of the naval profession. The bigger problem is the acquisition and enhancement of individual knowledge and skill of every officer and enlisted men assigned aboardships. And the biggest problem of all is the much needed skill and teamwork among the ship's crew and among participating warships that are fighting or engaging the enemy in the different aspects of naval warfare.

Among the members of the central staff at Headquarters Philippine Navy, it was only the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel (N-1) that was happy with the delay on the implementation of the AFP Modernization. He was happy because he knows personally that the whole corps of PN officers and enlisted men is not yet ready to man modern ships. This grim assessment was admitted by the former N-1, Captain Diofonce F. Tunacao PN(GSC), in the presence of the graduating First Class Cadets (Class 2000) when he represented the Philippine Navy in a Seminar Workshop held at Lecture Hall "B", Philippine Military Academy, Baguio City sometime in February this year<sup>4</sup>.

Captain Mateo M. Mayuga PN(GSC), also former N-1 that preceded Capt Tunacao, theorized that if modern naval ships will be delivered today, its serviceability or operational conditions will not last long because the men using or operating them do not possess the necessary knowledge and skill for its proper operation, maintenance and repair<sup>5</sup>. It takes several years to acquire the necessary knowledge and skill on the aspect of operation, maintenance and repair just like in the case of the gunner's mates and electronic technicians involved in the repair and maintenance of the Otto-Melara guns. The ship has to wait for two years before repairs could even be started because the people who are going to conduct the repairs are still undergoing schooling abroad. The case of this Otto-Melara gun has caught the Philippine Navy flat footed. But on the other hand, it made some navy officers realized the importance of education and training on why it should be given priority over the acquisition of modern warships<sup>6</sup>. Preparation or lead-time in favor of

education and training over materiel acquisition takes years due to the numerous pre-requisites and fundamental knowledge needed before specific skills training could be conducted. Henceforth, the happiness of the former N-1 (Capt. Tunacao) due to the delay in the AFP modernization is well justified. Furthermore, there is a felt need to study the capability or readiness of PN personnel to man modern ships. This is to explore the possible reasons that caused the deterioration of knowledge and skill of PN personnel to hopefully propose a responsive solution.

From the period 05 May 1986 to 15 August 1989, when the author commanded five (5) navy ships, he has not heard of a single sea mishap involving a navy ship except for one (1) grounding and a collision of a navy ship against the timber pier at HPN. This is an indication that through the years, even the basic skills of our shipboard Commanding Officers have dangerously dwindled. For every incident, thousands or even millions of pesos of taxpayer's money has to be spent for the repair of damages to the ship, to the pier or both. Repercussions of such poor skill on the meager resources of the navy; towards the morale of the ship's crew; and the reputation of the fleet as a whole are quite unimaginable. Definitely, morale of the ships crew is adversely affected because they knew that an officer who is probably ignorant of his job is leading them. If their leader does not possess the basic skills, how much more of the complicated skills of making the ship fight or react to different threats coming from the air, surface and sub-surface?

The deterioration of knowledge and skills of our enlisted men is even worse. Records at the office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel (N-1), Headquarters Philippine Navy showed that there was a steady decline of those who passed the Promotional Examinations administered from 1988 to 1998. Out of the more than eight thousand (8,000) examinees only more than six hundred (600) plus passes the exam or an annual passing average of only 7.5%. Senior CPOs who had been administering this Promotional Examination for nearly three decades now, said that in the 1960s and 70s the annual passing average is more than fifty percent (50%). The probable cause of the deterioration of their knowledge was that more and more enlisted men were assigned ashore because of the seemingly rapid implementation of the rotation policy in which the people who replaced them were not properly briefed and oriented on the jobs that they assumed.

In 1970's and early eighties when the undersigned was still a young Lieutenant, he has personally observed that lower ranking petty officers (non-commissioned officers) were so effective and so efficient in running and managing the daily routine of his department or section aboard the ship. They could even perform the job of their department heads whenever these officers are out of the ship performing more delicate and important job for the ship. But these days, an officer has practically had to guide and supervise his men every minute and every inch of the way until the job is done. Gone are the days when every department or section aboardship is led and supervised only

by knowledgeable, skillful, efficient, effective and always happy-looking Petty Officers.

In the 1970's, we were the best in the ASEAN region. This was attested when every time there was a SEATO naval exercise, our officers and men were always congratulated by their counterparts due to their expertise<sup>7</sup>. At that time, the Philippines was the only country in Southeast Asia that have a real navy<sup>8</sup> and our ships had still anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capability. But today, such expertise is limited only to senior officers who undergone ASW schooling and were also exposed to such exercises. Unfortunately, their expertise was never passed on to their junior officers because actual fleet exercises were discontinued when ASW sensors and armaments were all strip off from the ships for the simple reason that the navy could no longer find spare parts for those ASW equipment hence they became beyond economical repair. As a consequence, both the courses and simulators had gone down to oblivion.

In the early 1980s we still have some leading Petty Officers aboardship that are capable to operate and manage their department at their own initiative and volition. Most of them have acquired training abroad. Today, almost all sections or departments aboardships are closely managed and supervised by an officer. This present set-up makes the life of the officers more miserable. So when the officer happens to be a newcomer aboardship, the whole ship suffers due to inefficiency and ignorance. This endangers the ship as well as

the life of the crew because the ignorance or stupidity of one member of the crew is enough sink the ship.

## Theoretical Framework




Figure 1: Paradigm of the Study

The conceptual framework as shown above is all about enhancing the training and education system of the Philippine Navy. The framework follows the input-output system, which includes input, process, output, outcome and a feedback mechanism.

Inputs of the conceptual framework consist of three areas that are necessary in enhancing the education and training system in the Philippine Navy. Specifically, these inputs consist of the following:

1. Relevance of present training doctrines, visions, objectives and philosophy.
2. Conceptual analysis of a relevant education and training system.
3. Level of knowledge and skills of PN personnel.
4. Qualification of instructors.
5. Relevance of training programs and curriculum.
6. Adequacy of training institutions, training aids and facilities.
7. Over-all effect of career management to education and training.
8. Availability of funds affecting education and training.
9. Perceptions of policy makers.

The process consists of revising doctrines to make it relevant in accordance with the AFP Modernization Program subject to the prevailing internal and external environment. The process also includes SWOT analysis to determine appropriate solutions to other problems that may be encountered along the way during the conduct of the study.

The process is expected to produce doctrines or institutional mechanisms that would update the knowledge and skills of PN personnel to finally qualify them to operate and maintain modern navy ships.


Enhancing the training doctrines, philosophy and vision will result to a responsive education and training system. Initially, the mechanisms will focus on the upgrading and modernizing of training aids, facilities, curriculum and the enhancement of instructor's knowledge.

## **The Problem**

*This paper aims to find out the relevance of Education and Training System of the Philippine Navy in accordance with the PN Modernization Program in order to propose probable solutions to the problem.*

There are perceived apparent gaps at various levels of skills needed in the Philippine Navy, which over the years may tend to enlarge. The first gap is the lack of knowledge and skill of PN personnel to perform efficiently on the present inventory of navy ships. This shortcoming seems to exist despite the fact that these floating assets are considered to be the most antiquated in the ASEAN region.

The second gap is the lack of knowledge and skill to man modern ships. The overall concept or general problem of this paper as represented by those gaps could be best illustrated in Figure 2 below:



**Figure 2:** Graphic Presentation of the Problem

## Statement of the Problem

Specifically, the study seeks to answer the following questions:

1. Is the present Training Doctrine responsive to the requirement of the Philippine Navy for modernization?

2. Are the training programs, instructors and facilities of the Philippine Navy training institutions adequate to sustain the present and modernization skills training of the Command.
3. Are the assignments, designation or exposures given to PN personnel are appropriate or in accordance with the acquired training?

### **Objectives of the Study**

1. To study the responsiveness of the PN Training Doctrines to the requirements of the command for modernization in terms of:
  - 1.1. Command's training philosophy.
  - 1.2. Command's vision and mission.
  - 1.3. Command's training objectives.
2. To evaluate the adequacy of the training programs, instructors and facilities of the Philippine Navy training institutions in sustaining the present and modernization requirement of the Command.
3. To determine the appropriateness of the assignments, practicum and exercises of PN personnel with regards to their acquired training.

## **Significance of the Study**

### ***1. National Strategic Importance***

The study of enhancing the Philippine Navy's Education and Training System will surely boost the PN personnel's readiness and capability to man, operate and maintain modern ships programmed to be acquired in accordance with the much awaited Modernization Program. The capability of any modern navy ship to fight or defend the country's territorial integrity against external threats is extremely dependent on the men inside those modern ships. Since the Navy is in the second line of defense against external threats (Philippine Air Force is the first line of defense), enhancing or updating therefore of our PN personnel's readiness and capability is of utmost importance.

Human Resource Development is one of the five pillars of AFP Modernization, which is equally important with Equipment Acquisition. Since AFP modernization is still being stalled by the non-availability of funds (or cash) needed to purchase modern weapons and equipment, the AFP could start modernizing the knowledge and skill of the navy and the air force.

Well-trained and skillful sailors develop confidence and self-respect for themselves. Their will to fight for the country is beyond question. Unlike today if they will be given pointed questions regarding their willingness to defend the country from external defense, they would probably answer in an affirmative because they are shy and afraid to be branded as cowards. But one thing is

definite, the real feelings within their hearts, their answers will be in the negative because with the kind of ships that they have, they knew they will not last for two days in naval battle. The saddest part is that they may not even know what happened to them because they might be sunk before they could see their enemy even on radar.

## 2. Enhancement of PN Capability to Accomplish Its Mission

The Philippine Navy has a mission to provide a prompt and sustained naval operation in order to support the accomplishment of AFP's mission. With such mission statement, a question arises as to "how prompt is the prompt and how sustain is the sustained naval operation". One thing the author is sure of; such question will be answered only by enhancing the capability of both the ship and the crew.

This study will definitely help the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Personnel (N-1) and FOIC, PN appraise the true state of PN personnel because that is the first stage of this study. Relatedly, this study shall also help the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for Education and Training (N-8) for he will be able to determine the training needs of PN personnel. Ultimately, this will convince both the Navy and AFP leadership to refocus their efforts towards Human Resource Development; realize the importance of war gaming and simulation; and hopefully give priority in the procurement of simulators.

Identification of individual capability of every PN personnel is probably the most important tool in personnel management. Once this is attained, the

PN will have no problem in picking up knowledgeable and skillful personnel that will man the first modern ships that the Philippine Navy may be able to acquire in the near future.

This study will hopefully further enlighten higher headquarters as to the grave effects, implications and repercussion of ill-trained, ignorant and uninspired personnel to national security. The navy being a part of the military as an instrument to national power must be given priority for its steady development<sup>9</sup>. Problems of the ground forces will surely be lessened if not totally eliminated if the navy could only cover and control the sea. Regarding our internal problems, the insurgents, terrorists and separatists traverse our internal waters practically unhampered transferring from one island to another with ease.

### 3. Timeliness and Relevance

An informal assessment or a mere observation to our PN floating assets, allowed us to gain an enlightened and at times surprising insights on the kind of navy that we have today. An ocular inspection to our existing training facilities, curriculum and training programs dismayed the author because it was the same curriculum and training facilities that he has taken and used twenty six years ago. It is on this predicament that the author considers the study so relevant and timely. The delayed implementation of the Modernization Program gives lead-time and breathing space for *Human Resource Development over Equipment Acquisition* to avoid PN personnel

being caught flat-footed in case the Navy will be able to acquire modern ships and no one might be qualified to man it. In fact, modernizing and updating of PN personnel knowledge and skills should have been maintained even if its equipment is becoming obsolete every year.

#### 4. Political and Economic Significance

As a political instrument of national power it is unthinkable to see naval officers that are ignorant of their job. How could we expect them to protect this country from external defense if they don't know their job? Suppose the US lease to us five modern ships, who do you think will man these ships? The operation of Navy ships to fight as a single unit is totally dependent on the knowledge and skills of officers inside that ship. The Navy being the second line of defense (first line of defense is Philippine Air Force), it is a must that these officers be fully equipped with the necessary knowledge and skills in the arts and sciences of naval warfare.

An efficient and effective navy could solve a large part of our political and economic problems. A strong navy can protect the endless maritime resources of the country, which are now being pillage by local and foreign malefactors. As one lawmaker said during a television talk show, whose date the author could not remember, foreign poachers alone extract about thirty five billions (P 35,000,000,000.00) of pesos worth of marine products every year from our territorial waters including the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). A strong navy could also enhance government revenues, which could be derived from the

thirty billion (P 30,000,000,000.00) peso maritime industries. They could also save the country some ten billion (P 10,000,000,000.00) pesos annually, which are lost through smuggling via our unpatrolled waters and coastal areas. An economic resurgence with the help of a strong navy will diminish and eventually demolish insurgency. Economic stability also leads to political stability, thence socio-cultural regeneration and military immutability<sup>10</sup>.

In her speech delivered during the 92<sup>nd</sup> anniversary of the Philippine Navy on June 23, 1990, President Corazon C. Aquino emphasized that, "we need a strong navy is beyond doubt. A strong navy is vital to the protection and sustenance of maritime based industries upon which we may have to rely in the coming years".

##### 5. Socio-cultural Dimension.

Naval officers imbued with high degree of moral values and professionalism serves as a model for other government workers. Proficiency in all aspect of naval profession is the vocation for all officers and the source of prestige within the organization. Virtue of honesty is inculcated to both officers and enlisted men. All of these are part and parcel of PN Education and Training System.

### **Scope and Limitations**

This paper deals mostly on the state of PN Education and Training System and its responsiveness to the AFP Modernization Program. However,

the study revolves only within the confines of Human Resource Development (HRD) on how far they are ready to man modern ships. It focuses on the present capability of PN personnel in terms of the knowledge and skills that he or she possesses. Other aspects such as career management, promotion and personnel administration were touched only when it somehow affected the development and acquisition of knowledge and skill. The study also delved on the sentiments, ideas and perceptions of the respondents.

This study was based on available documents, interviews and formal written surveys. Respondents of the survey were officers with the rank of Lieutenant Senior Grades only. The justification for such limitations was that these are the people who do most of the actual fighting aboardship and that they have already acquired enough experience and length of service whose data emanating from them were a reliable source of study. Additionally, officers who had reached this rank, normally have already completed the junior officers billet aboardship.

Questionnaire for this survey was a lengthy one. Hence, full cooperation of all concerned specially the unit commander, was fully utilized in order to accomplish this study. Questions were about modern ships, armaments, sensors, and the different aspects of naval warfare, curriculum, POIs, training facilities and institutions. Purposive sampling was conducted to 54 officers of the Philippine Navy. Only those assigned within Manila, Cavite and Zambales area were given questionnaires due to time constraint and limited resources.

## **Definition of Terms**

1. Education – the acquisition of broad, general and specific knowledge, skills, competence and desirable traits, values and attitudes acquired through a formal course of study, instruction or training which include the conditioning, strengthening and disciplining of the intellect and other human faculties.

2. Training – the development of a particular skill or group of skills through a regimen of drills, exercises, practices and other systems primarily designed to enhanced precision and disciplined responses.

3. PN personnel – refers to both officers and enlisted personnel of the Philippine Navy.

4. Skill – the ability or expertise of an officer or enlisted man to perform job-related activity, which contributes to the effective performance of assigned tasks. Specifically, it includes the ability to operate equipment and able to detect and prosecute enemy ships, aircraft and submarines. (This includes their instinct to think and react accurately within split second specially when they detect an incoming missile or torpedo).

5. Knowledge – specific information or facts that are required to develop the skills and attitudes necessary to accomplish effectively the jobs, duties and tasks of a certain billet. With regards to this study, it refers to the technical knowledge regarding modern armaments, sensors, electronic countermeasures and their usage to the different aspects of naval warfare.

6. Attitude – psychological view or disposition of a person toward his unit, job or assigned tasks.

7. Simulators -- they are modern navy simulators that depict the characteristics of a fighting ship. It could be the exact replica of Bridge Simulator, Radar Simulator, Anti-Submarine Detection Information Center (ASDIC) Simulator, Sonar Simulator and Combat Information Center (CIC) Simulator complete with the features of a Naval Tactical Data System (NTDS).

8. Combat Information Center (CIC) – it is a room or big compartment, which serves as the brain or nerve center of any fighting ship. It collects, integrates, collates, process and displays all information from both inside and outside the ship gathered by its sensors including the prevailing weather.

9. Bridge – usually the highest part of the ship where it is controlled or maneuvered.

10. Anti-submarine Detection and Information Center (ASDIC) – a compartment adjacent but separate from the Bridge or CIC purely dedicated to detecting enemy submarines.

11. Countermeasures – refers to electronic equipment and actions used to distract and evade incoming missiles, torpedoes, radio signals, acoustic and magnetic resonance. (Examples of countermeasures: noisemaker, degaussing device, chaff, praire-masker, electronic countermeasures, emission control policy, hammer box, ECCM's etc.).

12. Readiness – The physical, mental and psychological status of both officers and enlisted men of the PN to man, operate and maintain modern ships and effectively engage enemy ships in the different aspect of naval warfare.

13. Sensors – refers to the different detecting equipment or devices such as radars, sonars, radios, electronic countermeasures, satellite imagery, identification friend or foe (IFF) and other electronic devices used to detect the presence of enemy ships, aircraft and weapons.

14. Weapons – devices used to destroy or disable enemy ships, aircraft or installations such as guns, missiles, torpedoes, lasers, mines, bombs etc.

## Chapter 2

### Review of Related Literature and Studies

#### 1. Related Studies

There were several studies conducted in the past that somehow touches on human resource development. However, none of them has delve extensively on the education and skills training of PN personnel. The present defect or inadequacy of knowledge and skill of PN personnel is not only the concern of navy leadership but by everyone in the navy organization.


The gap between the present skill and the skill required to efficiently operate the present inventory of Navy ships is very evident as proven by the study of Captain Antonieto D. Ferrer PN(MNSA). For the last five years, collisions and grounding of navy ships were so rampant compared to previous years<sup>11</sup>. Most grounding happened over shallow waters and reefs, which are clearly indicated on nautical charts while collisions varies from between two ships or between a ship and a pier. Such incidents are reflections of poor shiphandling, navigation and seamanship. These skills are basic requirements for all prospective shipboard Commanding Officers before they are being qualified to assume their initial command-at-sea by the Command-at-Sea Board.

Shiphandling is less than five percent (5%) of the Commanding Officers job. However, his career and reputation as navy officer is very much at stake in such simple job. Whenever a navy ship is involved in any form of sea

mishap, news of such incident spreads like wildfire and within an hour, the whole navy organization knows already about the incident.

Such incidents most of the times are product of poor implementation of the rotation policy. Many officers stayed too long in shore assignments failing to review his notes at least every six months thereby forgetting even the basics of navigation, seamanship and shpshhandling.

Part of the findings of Capt. Ferrer is clearly shown in Figure 3 below.



**Source:** Fleet Inspector General Office, Headquarters Philippine Fleet, Cavite City. Compilation of Maritime Incidents Involving PN Ships by Capt. A. Ferrer PN(GSC)

**Figure 3 : Maritime Incidents from 1994 to 1998.**

a. **Masteral Thesis of Capt. Narciso M. Liston PN(MNSA)** titled Career Management Systems of Officers in the Philippine Navy,; An Analytical

Study, (NDCP, 1998). The study determines the extent whereby navy officers' career patterns match the PN professional development path. It deals mostly on schooling (both local and abroad); promotion in rank; assignment in billet following career pattern for officers in the Philippine Navy.

Findings of the study revealed that officers met the educational requirement prior to their entry in the service. Majority are Bachelors Degree holders except those who were called to active duty by virtue of Republic Act 718. Some even have more than one degree on their credit. On the promotion aspect, promotion from Ensign to Captain was quite easy. However, promotion from Captain to Commodore was too slow due to political interference and the tendency of senior officers to hang on to their office to the disadvantage of lower ranking aspiring officers. The assignment aspect of the PN Development Path is the weakest link in the program. Only 27% have experienced the complete ship-to-shore rotation. Majority have incomplete assignments and 10% have only one ship assignment throughout his career.

The study of Captain Liston did not discuss whatsoever on skills or skills training.

**b. Masteral Thesis of Cdr. Arturo Y. Capada PN(MNSA)** titled Assessment of the Anti-submarine Warfare Capabilities of the Philippine Navy, (NDCP, 1998). The study deals mostly on ASW platforms, its sensors, armaments, countermeasures, communications and ship's manning. On ship's manning of the seven (7) ASW ships, his study found out that only thirty six percent (36%) of the total number of officers and sonarmen have ASW training

and only a handful have actually had exercise experience with a submarine. The study did not touch on skills training although it gave the poor status of PN personnel capability or skill on Anti-submarine Warfare. Other findings of the study states that the Philippine Navy can not deter external aggression. It can only meet internal defense requirements but they are predominantly not naval task. One important contribution is the effort of the Philippine Marines, which are infantry in nature. Another effort is the contribution of the Philippine Coast Guard, which is law enforcement. The Philippine Fleet could only perform in assisting the two counterparts.

c. **Masteral Thesis of Capt. Eduardo L. Tolentino PN(MNSA)** titled *Critical Analysis of RP Naval Capabilities*, (NDCP, 1999). The study deals on the PN capabilities based on the actual inventory of PN assets at that time versus the prevailing maritime environment. The author measured the PN ship's capability on the different aspects of naval warfare. The study mentioned only ones that "naval training system regarding responsiveness to present and future requirements needs qualitative and quantitative improvements."

d. **Masteral Thesis of Capt. Manuel I. De Leon PN(GSC)** titled "The Philippine Navy Fleet Modernization Program: An Analysis", (NDCP, 1999). The study deals on a macro level of concept on how to modernize the Philippine Fleet. It focused more on materiel development and strategy on how to deal with external threat. The study mentioned human resource

development on macro or generalized terms but did not discussed on the problem of deteriorating skills of PN personnel or the remedial skills training.

## **Chapter 3**

### **Design and Methodology**

#### **Research Design**

Documentary analysis and interviews was used extensively in this study. Primary data gathered through interview survey was conducted in order to triangulate and confirm the data gathered through secondary documentary analysis. The author's personal experience and his exposure aboard different navy ships and training institutions around the World were also incorporated in the analyses as an expert on the subject.

#### **Respondents**

The respondents of the study were middle grade officers with the rank of Lieutenant Senior Grade (equivalent to Captain in the Army) taken from the officers of the Philippine Navy assigned within Manila, Cavite and Zambales area. With some limitations, they fairly represent a cross-section of the Philippine Navy Officers Corps. These officers were purposively used as samples because they are the ones who do most of the fighting aboardship. The efficiency and effectiveness of any fighting ship is highly dependent on the efficiency, agility and alertness of this group of officers. A new doctrine aboard a modern warship states that the Weapons Officer has the authority to prioritize targets and fire close-in and point defense weapons even without the approval of the Commanding Officer whenever they detected an incoming missiles, enemy aircraft or even projectiles. They are the ones performing the

job of Weapons Officer, Combat Information Center (CIC) Officer, Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) Officer, Surface Warfare Officer, Deck and Gunnery Officer (DGO), Anti-air Warfare (AAW) Officer, Communications and Electronics Officer, Operations officer, Officer of the Deck (OOD) or Officer on Watch (OOW), Executive officer of minor ships and similar junior officer's billet. With such rank, most of them should have already performed those jobs if they have followed the well established and highly revered career path in the Philippine Navy<sup>12</sup>. (Some officers of the navy were also quite advanced in performing officer's billet like the author of this paper. He commanded five (5) PN ships and completed shipboard billets when he was still a Lieutenant Senior Grade way back in August of 1989).

Training is the responsibility of both the individual personnel and the command. Henceforth, these middle grade officers have in one way or another been exposed to Human Resource Development. They have enough experiences whose answers in the survey questionnaire could be a reliable source of study.

### **Data Gathering, Methods and Procedures**

An interview questionnaire was used as the primary tool in this study. This was supported by personal interviews of the previous and present instructors of NETC and other PN training centers. Research on documentary evidences was conducted to triangulate the data gathered. Attached to a letter

addressed to the respondents was a five-page survey questionnaire enclosed herewith as Annex A.

The author endeavored to interview the policy makers like the members of the HPN central staff involve in Human Resource Development like N-1, N-3 and N-8 in order to support the findings on the PN training goals and objectives. Views of the implementers were also taken like the Commander of NETC, Commanding Officer of FORTEG, School Superintendents of the different PN training institutions, Course Directors and instructors.

Secondary data were obtained from available documents at Headquarters Philippine Navy, Naval Education and Training Command, Fleet Operational Training and Evaluation Group, AFP General Headquarters and at the different PN training institutions. To generate information on the different areas of concerns of this study, the data gathering methods is summarized as follows:

Areas of Concern	Methods
1. Training programs and curriculum	Document analysis, interview and survey questionnaire
2. Training institutions and facilities	Document analysis, interview and survey questionnaire
3. Faculty and training instructors	Document analysis, interview and survey questionnaire

**Figure 4 : SUMMARY OF DATA GATHERING APPROACHES**

In data gathering, the following activities were conducted:

1. The first step was by conducting research at GHQ and at HPN on existing policies regarding training, human resource development and personnel management.

2. Conducted research at NDCP on existing policies and literature related to the problem.

3. Coordinated with N-1, N-3, N-5 and N-8 for support and advises that ensured the success of this study.

4. Prepared a letter addressed to the respondents enclosed with it the 5-page survey questionnaire and also conducted interviews to both policy makers and implementors.

5. Coordinated with Commanders and Unit CO's at Manila / Cavite area for their support in distributing and retrieving survey questionnaires.

6. Coordinated with the Superintendent, Naval Education and Training Command for the support and cooperation of both the NETC faculty and students.

### **Treatment of Data**

The analyses of data were treated mainly from a qualitative point of view. This qualitative analysis was extensively used in assessing the whole system of education and training in the Philippine Navy especially in the areas of doctrines, course curriculum, training programs, training facilities, training aids, simulators, instructors qualification and support facilities. A strength and weakness analysis was conducted especially on the elements and wholesome

environment that contributed to the enhancement of PN Education and Training System. For quantitative analysis, the method of percentage analysis was used as appropriate. However, the Likert formula as stated below was used for questions whose answers are not significant or whose average is almost at the median.

$$\text{Average} = \frac{5(f)a + 4(f)b + 3(f)c + 2(f)d + 1(f)e}{\text{Total number of respondents}}$$

Where: f = frequency (a to e represents the five answers with a

Scale: a = 4.1 to 5.0 corresponding descending value of **5 to 1**)

b = 3.1 to 4.0

c = 3 (mean)

d = 2.0 to 2.9

e = 1.0 to 1.9

A purposive sampling was conducted to 54 officers that are assigned in Manila, Cavite and Zambales area. This figure was enough to attain margin of error less than ten percent using the formula : (Sevilla 1984: 159-160)

$$n = \frac{N}{1 + Ne} \quad \text{where} \quad \begin{array}{l} N = \text{Population size} \\ n = \text{Sample size} \\ e = \text{Margin of error} \end{array}$$

## CHAPTER 4

### PRESENTATION, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION OF DATA

#### Part I: Findings on Documentary Analysis

##### **A. PN Training Philosophy, Vision and Objectives:**

1. Training Philosophy - “The Philippine navy shall develop its manpower to become professionals in the employment of naval resources towards the attainment of the navy’s roles and mission through progressive education and fleet training”. It was conceived to set the direction and harmonize the education and training efforts towards a professional and competent naval force<sup>13</sup>.

2. Vision – The Navy envisions a professional core of officers and men in all levels of Command. They should be look-up as public servants imbued with high degree of professionalism and are outbound to fulfill the lofty mandate of the Constitution. This vision was further amplified on a macro level by the former and present Flag Officer-in-Command, thus:

*“We shall have a Navy that is ready for the operational needs of the present, just as it is prepared for the demands of the future”.*

VADM Luisito F. Fernandez AFP

FOIC, Philippine Navy - November 1999

“Guided by the wisdom from yesterday and the daring dreams of today, we set sail for the visions for tomorrow,

Help me nurture a culture of honesty and transparency, of professionalism and integrity, of competence and discipline, and of efficiency and responsibility that is free of graft and corruption.” -

RADM Guillermo G. Wong AFP

FOIC, Philippine Navy – Dec. 2000

3. Goal and Objectives – The ultimate goal of PN Education and Training is to attain and sustain professionalism, tactical proficiency and operational readiness in order to ensure the successful accomplishment of its assigned roles and mission.

B. ***Evaluation of present courses, curriculum and Program of Instructions (POI) as to its efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness to the present dispensation.***

Courses that are still being offered today both at the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and the Fleet Operational Readiness Training and Evaluation Group (FORTEG), are still the same courses we have taken twenty five years (25) ago. All of them are still designed to operate World War II vintage warships. The only course whose curriculum has a semblance of modernization is the Combat Information Center (CIC) Course. However, it is still ninety percent (90 %) primitive and

only ten percent (10 %) modern. Hence, its graduates will not qualify to operate CICs of modern ships. The ideal mix for CIC course is ninety five percent (95 %) modern and five percent (5%) primitive. The primitive portion is also necessary because it deals on historical accounts and case studies of previous mistakes as well as outstanding tactical maneuvers worthy of emulation.

Annex D of this paper gives the complete list of local training courses being conducted in the following training institutions of the Philippine Navy while Annex E gives the complete list of foreign training courses that has been regularly conducted or offered in foreign training schools. Analyzing all those courses, less than five percent are designed or teaches on how naval ships fight and defend as a unit. Most of the courses are about maintenance and operation of certain equipment, administrative and managerial courses. Not a single course is devoted to naval warfare.

Courses being offered today for officers by PN training institutions are all basic or pre-entry courses and specialization / billet courses. Samples are enumerated below:

1. Naval Officers Qualification Course - - - - - Basic / Pre-entry Course
2. Marine Basic Officers Course - - - - - Basic / Pre-entry Course
3. Intelligence Officers Basic Course - - - - - Basic / Pre-entry Course
4. Deck and Gunnery Officers Course - - - - - Billet / Specialization Course
5. Mess and Supply Officers Course - - - - - Billet / Specialization Course

Basic and pre-entry courses teaches only the basic or fundamental idea or concept of what naval warfare is all about because time allocation given to these subject is only 2 to 3 hours. Since this is no longer practiced after graduation when they are already in the field, this basic knowledge in naval warfare are easily forgotten<sup>14</sup>. Syllabus of other courses does not in any way touches on naval warfare.

With the advent of the Modernization Program, proposals are still being hatched at N-5 in coming up with Skills Development Programs. The proposed program is aimed at ensuring the development of relevant skills to be synchronized with the scheduled delivery of new ships and equipment. Information received from the former deputy N-1 himself, the Navy had not yet started implementing the plan<sup>15</sup>. Well it's really obvious because as the plan has stated, training will start only when the Philippine Government has signed the contract with the company that would build and deliver the ships. While the plan looks excellent and extensive, the author don't agree with the timetable for the start of training because it would be too late if the Navy has to wait for the signing of contract before the start of training could be started. There are pre-requisite or fundamental knowledge that is generic in nature before skills training could be conducted. This generic knowledge refers to the arts and sciences of the different aspects of naval warfare, which would take months to acquire. Education and training on the generic knowledge should start now to

all general line officers so that the PN Human Resource Development Plan should be able to take off.

In fact, human resource development should have been given a priority a long time ago with or without the AFP modernization program. Because in my humble opinion, in case our country will be drawn into a total war with another country, our national leaders might decide to muster all the nation's resources and we may be able to procure modern ships at once. Or probably our allies might lease or give us modern ships but surely we can not train officers and men in so short time that will man these ships. And definitely, it will be impossible and even stupendous to hire foreigners to man those modern ships and let them fight for us.

Following are Operational or Generic Courses designed for external defense:

- |                           |                          |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Anti-submarine Warfare | e. Amphibious Operations |
| b. Surface Warfare        | f. Electronic Warfare    |
| c. Anti-air Warfare       | g. Naval Special Warfare |
| d. Mine Warfare           | h. Submarine Warfare     |

These courses listed above must be preceded by a CIC course to facilitate understanding. Henceforth, it would be practical to make CIC Course as a pre-requisite to any of the above courses or better still be made as an integral module. Follow-up courses to the above operational courses, which are highly technical and already belonging to the second level of specialization for officers, are as follows:

- |                              |                           |
|------------------------------|---------------------------|
| a. Missile Systems           | h. Computer Programming   |
| b. Fire Control Systems      | i. Information Technology |
| c. Radar & Microwave System  | j. Meteorology            |
| d. Naval Architecture        | k. Oceanography           |
| e. Ordnance Engineering      | l. Biological Engineering |
| f. Metallurgical Engineering | m. Hydraulics             |
| g. Advance Electronics       | n. Marine Engineering     |

The PN Skills Development Program is also aimed to conduct Administrative Courses. The author believes that these courses could be conducted with only basic or pre-entry courses as pre-requisite. These proposed Administrative Courses are as follows:

- |                           |                               |
|---------------------------|-------------------------------|
| a. Project Management     | e. Organizational Development |
| b. Educational Management | f. Logistics Management       |
| c. Curriculum Development | g. Human Resource Dev't       |
| d. Doctrines Development  | h. Base/Facilities Management |

***C. Documentary analysis of present laws and policies governing the Human Resource Development.***

1. Section 17, Article II of the 1987 Philippine Constitution states that “the state shall give priority to education, science and technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate social progress, and promote total human liberation and development”.

2. Republic Act 7898 is known to be the “AFP Modernization Act”. Section 2 of this act provides that one of the principal thrusts of the modernization program shall be the undertaking of reforms in the recruitment, training, employment and management of AFP personnel. Under this mandate, Human Resource Development is the most vital component of the AFP Modernization Program. As ex-President Fidel V. Ramos commented during his incumbency, “modernization is not only a question of acquiring state-of-the-art fighting materiel. The most important weapon-system is the individual soldier because in the end, it is he who matters – what’s in his heart and mind; how he relates to his duty, his commanders, his people and his country”. He considers the development of a professional soldier in all aspects of professionalism as the “benchmark” of AFP Modernization.

3. AFP Human Resource Development Program prepared by the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel (J-1), General Headquarters Armed Forces of the Philippines. This undated program formulated and proposed the Integrated Human Resource Planning and Development System (IHRPDS), which serve as the guide of the major services and other AFP units in managing their respective personnel. IHRPDS is very laudable because of its extensiveness. It appears to be the mother of all programs as far as HRD is concerned. Implementation of this program has just started. Modernizing and updating the knowledge and skill of AFP personnel would still take a long way before it could even be started.

4. AFP Education and Training System dated 1997. The goal of this manual is to ensure highly qualified and competent personnel at all levels of the AFP in support of the shift of the AFP's mission from internal security operations to external defense within the framework of a modernized AFP. All the six (6) objectives of the manual have a direct bearing on the study. In summary, its objectives are as follows: (1) to provide education and training opportunities to all AFP members for his entire career; (2) strengthen AFPETS programs and policies which shall impart knowledge, skills and desired values; (3) develop professional and dedicated corps of professors, instructors and support personnel in all AFP schools; (4) to provide adequate, relevant and modernize training facilities, aids, materials and equipment; (5) to provide career guidance and counseling; (6) to fully develop the AFP capability along its modernization program. As far as the navy is concerned under the sixth objective, the naval capabilities covers the following areas: (a) surface warfare, (b) offshore patrol, (c) anti-submarine warfare, (d) mine warfare, (e) naval air reconnaissance, (f) coastal patrol, (g) underwater warfare, (h) amphibious operation, (i) engineering, (j) command, control and communications, (k) bases and (l) integrated logistic support system.

5. AFP Personnel Directive No. 01 dated 04 April 1995. This directive is titled Policies and Procedures Governing Assignments / Reassignments of Students from Foreign Service Schools. It is in consonance with the GHQ circular number 10 dated 21 June 1993 titled Selection and Utilization of Students Trained in Foreign Schools / Institutions. The purpose of

both directive is to assign military personnel who studied / trained in Foreign Service schools to appropriate AFP / Major Services training units and they will be primarily utilized as instructors. They could also be assigned in the field, staff or technical positions where maximum utilization can be made but with justification.

6. PN Human Resource Development Plan. This undated proposed plan is still subject to finalization and FOIC's approval. It is so extensive and comprehensive in scope. This plan has two programs: The first is the Systems Development Programs, which has also five sub-programs. The five sub-programs are as follows:

a. Procurement and Attrition Program – efficiently filling-up the manpower requirement by recruitment and retention of the best personnel.

b. Career Management and Training Program – maintaining the skill level of personnel and the jobs to be undertaken at all levels.

c. Morale and Welfare Program – maintaining human resource at their peak psychologically and physically by providing quality health services and improving the benefits they are entitled to.

d. Discipline, Law and Order Program – developing highly disciplined and conscientious personnel by strengthening law and order system.

d. Reservist Affairs Program – developing the quality of the navy’s reserve force.

The second program under HRD Plan is PN Skills Development Programs whose objective is to develop skills relevant to PN Modernization that will be synchronized with the delivery of new vessels and equipment. The only thing that the author disagrees with this plan is that training of the prospective crew will start only when contract has already been signed between the Philippine Government and the company that will build the ships. If this happens, it will be too late. Education on generic knowledge or operational courses should start now in preparation for a specific skills training for certain equipment, armament and sensors.

7. Navy Education and Training Manual (PNM 10-1). This manual was promulgated by Vice Admiral Virgilio Q. Marcelo AFP on 30 June 1994. The provision of this manual was generic in nature apparently designed to meet the requirement of the PN for a modest capability focusing on professionalism. The manual failed to emphasize the importance of updating and upgrading the knowledge and skills of PN personnel even on the operational courses so that when modernization is implemented, PN training institution could easily proceed to technical or specialization courses.

7. HPN Circular No. 02 dated 20 January 1999. The circular is titled “Establishing Seven Fields of Specialization for PN Officers”. This circular emanated from the vision of the incumbent FOIC at that time, Vice Admiral Eduardo Ma R. Santos AFP, of a trio-based organization composed of

warriors, providers and trainers. The warrior fields are: Naval Operation (NAVOPS) and Marine Operations (MAROPS). Providers consist of three fields: Naval Engineering, Weapons, Communications and Electronics (NEWCE), Naval Construction (NAVCON) and Naval Logistics, Comptrollership and Finance (NLCF). The trainer field is Manpower Administration (MPAD).

The system aims to promote a more efficient career management for officers, which will strengthen the technical and administrative support system of the PN in preparation for our modernization. This was also the reaction of the command for the long-standing clamor for officer's specialization. The reason behind this was that a lot of navy officers while still in the junior years spend their career in juicy and lax positions ashore and suddenly forced their way up aboardship to comply the sea duty as required to all general line officers. The navy usually calls this "fast track system" because they are promoted in billet way ahead of their counterpart although they have not yet satisfied the MROB (Minimum Requirements for Officers Billet). The only reason given is that they are already seniors.

Human Resource Development (HRD) is just one of the five (5) components of AFP Modernization Program. The other four (4) components are: Equipment or Materiel Acquisition, Bases Support Development, Doctrines Development and Equipment Rehabilitation and Upgrading. Human Resource Development is the most vital component of the AFP Modernization

Program. As ex-President Fidel V. Ramos said during his incumbency, “modernization is not only a question of acquiring state-of-the-art fighting materiel. The most important weapon-system is the individual soldier because in the end, it is he who matters – what’s in his heart and mind; how he relates to his duty, his commanders, his people and his country”. He considers the development of a professional soldier as the “benchmark” of AFP Modernization. Unfortunately, per informal inquiry conducted at the Naval Modernization Office, Headquarters Philippine Navy, they indeed have not yet started on the aspect of Human Resource Development (HRD) Program.

Yet, despite the much-delayed implementation of AFP modernization, it seems the Philippine Navy have not yet taken steps to take advantage of modernizing the knowledge and skill of PN personnel. Information received from the Naval Modernization Office, they indeed have not yet started on the Human Resource Development Plan<sup>16</sup>.

***D. Comparative analysis between previous experiences and practices versus the present practices.***— In the 1960s and 70s, snappy and knowledgeable officers and enlisted men are assigned aboard patrol ships because they are considered the pride and elite members of the fleet. These men stood proud and tall whenever they walk inside naval bases and other military units because that was the prevailing and accepted customs, beliefs and tradition at that time. But such fine naval tradition and beliefs were easily eroded and abruptly changed in less than a year when numerous

officers assigned ashore specifically those assigned in finance, logistics, intelligence and comptrollership services, were temporarily promoted to the next higher rank in 1985. However, not a single officer assigned aboardship was temporarily promoted. This single act of the navy leadership demoralized the whole navy officers corps who valued so much sea duty and the well established shipboard unwritten tradition. From that time on until today majority of both officers and enlisted men prefers to be assigned on those so called "juicy assignments" because of those misdirected promotions and the much rumored economic benefits that unwittingly comes along not to mention the less tedious job compared to shipboard assignment. Shipboard assignment now is the least preferred assignment. Most of them go aboardship for purposes of compliance because sea duty and command-at-sea badge were made as requirements for promotion and assignments to sensitive positions. There are more advantages of being assigned ashore. One of which is the opportunity of seeing his family too often while those assigned aboardship takes several months before he could see his family. Because of the hardships and disadvantages of being assigned aboardship, suddenly every body wants to be assigned ashore and be involved in logistics, finance and comptrollership activities. This scramble for shore assignments had contributed immensely to the deterioration of the knowledge and skill of both our officers and enlisted men except those who were assigned at the training institution.

On the whole, results of secondary data revealed that the PN Education and Training System needs updating, revision and enhancement. On the different aspects of the system, it was only the instructor's qualification that was given a passing grade. The other aspects such as doctrines, training programs, curriculum, training aids and facilities were given a dismal ratings in varying degrees. This present set-up is understandable because majority of the instructors in the PN training institutions have undergone schooling abroad<sup>17</sup>.

Training doctrines and visions, which controls and guide the whole system must be given priority in upgrading so that other aspects would follow the same direction towards modernization. At the moment, the whole PN organization is fully sold to the idea that modernization must be attained at the soonest possible time especially that political will is already in place per Republic Act No. 7898 known as AFP Modernization Act. Although this act is already six (6) years behind schedule, the author believes that the Navy should have already started on the two pillars of modernization, which are *Doctrines Development* and *Human Resource Development*. These two pillars may need three to five year lead-time over Equipment Acquisition because of the fundamental and pre-requisite knowledge needed to acquire the specialized knowledge and skills for certain equipment. For example, before any officer could undergo schooling or specialize on Missile and Fire Control Systems, it is a must that he should have the basic or general knowledge in

both Surface and Anti-air Warfare. In similar manner, he must also have that basic knowledge in Physics, Mathematics and Electronics.

The present training programs, aids, facilities and curriculum are the ones that could be considered as the main problems. These aspects of Education and Training are still designed to operate World War II vintage navy ships. The training programs and curriculum were still the same as what the author have taken 25 years ago. Training aids, simulators and facilities are even worse because many of them were already gone and never replaced. Commanders of those PN training institutions for the last two decades seems not to understand the importance of those things in a teaching and learning situation. As of the moment, the different Navy training institutions have little or no capability at all to develop the knowledge and skills required for modern warfare<sup>18</sup>.

When the author underwent schooling in the United States way back in 1983, officers of the US Navy with Filipino roots confided to him that it takes several years of training through near-real life simulators before any one could be classified as skillful CIC or ASW officer. Additionally, every three years or a maximum of five years, the same officer has to undergo schooling again in the same course in order for him to be updated on the additional features or capabilities of new weapons or sensors that has just been invented.

The courses taken in Continental United States by the author are as follows: **Combat Information Center (CIC) Course** taken at Fleet ASW Training Center Atlantic (FASWTCA), Dam Neck, Norfolk, Virginia; **Anti-**

***submarine Warfare (ASW) Course*** and ***Naval Control in the Protection of Shipping (NCPS) Course*** both taken at Fleet ASW Training Center Pacific, Naval Training Command; and ***Instructor Course*** in Naval Service School both situated in San Diego, California. These courses, which were taken immediately after the other, lasted for ninety-five (95) days. It was his knowledge and experiences in these schooling that prodded and convinced him to use it as one of basis of his thesis.

It takes several years to train officers and EP's to be skillful on the different aspects of naval warfare because of the scientific and highly technical knowledge required before skills training could be conducted. When we say skillful, we mean that the officer or EP concerned should be able to decide and act within a split second. This is the kind of skill that modern navy needs today due to the advent of modern technology. When an incoming missiles or torpedo is detected, every one hundredth of a second counts. But it requires several months of skills training aboard near-real life simulators before such kind of skill (or instinct, as we may classify it) is developed.

Presently, the Philippine Navy does not have any modern simulators. The last simulator that the navy had was a World War II vintage Dead Reckoning Tracer (DRT – main equipment inside the CIC used for anti-submarine and surface warfare) that was last seen operating in 1982 at FORTEG (Fleet Operational Readiness Training and Evaluation Group), Fort San Felipe, Cavite City. Hence, most of the time for the past several years, fleet exercises were limited to gunnery and basic tactical maneuvers. Apparently, most of the

navy officers and enlisted men have already forgotten the basic knowledge and skill in Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW), Anti-Air Warfare (AAW) and Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW) which are the meat or essence of Naval Warfare. Without simulators, it is hard and almost impossible for the ship's crew to learn and attain individual skill and teamwork in all aspects of naval operations.

Dead Reckoning Tracers (DRT) were used in the last World War and they are considered as the first generation of computerized simulators because they still uses electronic tubes. The *own ship* position is the only one automatically indicated by a tiny light, which moves as the ship moves on Earth's surface. The different *contacts* gathered from radar and sonar is manually plotted (in relation to own ship position) on a tracing paper placed on top of the DRT table. An experienced plotter could plot or trace five (5) contacts representing enemy ships or submarines (or combination of both) while inexperienced plotters could trace an average of only two (2) contacts. In short, DRTs are still 80% manually operated.

The DRT was followed by NC2, which was invented in the mid-fifties. NC2s are considered the second generation, however, they are only an improvement of the DRT. This time a single plotter could easily trace an average of twenty (20) contacts because all the contacts together with the own ship, are already automatically indicated on the plotting table. Unlike in the DRT, contacts detected by sonar and radar has to be relayed vocally to the plotter. This makes the CIC room so noisy. (For still unknown reason, the

Philippine Navy did not acquire a single unit of NC2 even for education and training purposes only).

It was a blessing in disguise that the navy did not acquire NC2 because it was short-lived and gone into obsolescence in the late 1970s when Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS) was invented. NTDS was the third generation and the first honest-to-goodness computer systems aboard ship. Data or contacts gathered by the different sensors aboard ship like radar, sonar, electronic countermeasures, identification friend or foe (IFF) and other electronically operated devices, are automatically transmitted, integrated and processed at a speed of light. The end products are all displayed in a big console indicating therein the complete picture of the area of operation. Exact positions and movements of all friendly and enemy ships, aircraft, submarines and even incoming or outgoing missiles and torpedoes are seen live on that console. Other consoles displays digital data such as bearing and distance of certain contact; its target angle; closest point of approach; course and speed of contact; and other solutions or answers to battle related problems.

Although NTDS is rapidly entering into the period of obsolescence because they are again being replaced now by the newest technology called ACDS, most navies around the world except probably the Philippines, are still using the NTDS. ACDS has already been installed aboard the newest ships of the United States Navy. (The author would like to express his apology for he could not explain the features of ACDS. He had not seen one yet in actual

operation. He just learned of this latest technology only through the Jane's Defense Weekly magazine about two (2) years ago).

Simulator saves time, effort, POL products and most importantly, it prevent the ship's machineries and equipment from fair wear and tear thereby preserving the ship's serviceability. It facilitates individual training and at the same time it also enhances team, unit and even fleet training. It also trains a lot of people in a short period with the least budget or expenses.

During the last three ASEAN Training Cruise, which the undersigned have participated, he observed that every time he saw the simulators of Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore, there were improvements made (on the features of software) compared to when he had seen them the last time. It goes to show that their simulators are updated on whatever new technology has been invented in both weapons and sensors. He learned also from their tour guides that they spent four days inside the simulators and just one day at sea conducting actual fleet exercises to put into actual practice (except actual use of live weapons) what they had been practicing in the simulators. And what a pity, majority of the middle grade PN officers that were with us during the tour, does not even know what to ask because it was the first time they saw navy simulators. Worst, some of them did not even know what they are used for.

In the 1960's and 1970's, PN officers and personnel were the best in the ASEAN navies in terms of knowledge and skill in the different aspects of naval warfare. This was observed during the SEATO exercises in the late sixties and early seventies. PN officers and personnel feels ten (10) foot high every after

exercise because their counterparts always congratulate them for their expertise. Today they could probably be the worst among the ASEAN navies for reason that their expertise now is limited to navigation, seamanship, shiphandling, shipboard engineering, shipboard administration and basic tactical maneuvers. PN leadership in the 1980's and in the early 1990's gave excuses that priority has been given to counter-insurgency and civil military operations. Aside from that, they said that it is useless to maintain knowledge and expertise in complicated naval operations because they are no longer applicable in the present inventory of World War II vintage navy ships of the Philippine Navy. This seemingly perverted reasoning caused the rapid deterioration of PN personnel's capability.

#### **E. SWOT Analysis on the PN Education and Training System**

The Philippine Navy Education and Training Environment could be assessed as follows:

##### **Strengths**

1. Training institutions are well established.
2. Courses are offered by foreign schools.
3. Specialization for Manpower Administration among officers is being implemented.
4. Instructors are willing to improve and be developed.
5. Staff personnel are established at all levels.

6. There are enough officers who graduated from foreign schools who could start revising the existing POIs and Curricula.

### **Weaknesses**

1. Fund resources are inadequate. This is the main reason why the much-awaited modernization could not take-off.
2. Lack of personnel database. The command do not have information as to who among the graduates in foreign schools are qualified and willing to be instructors as their life-long profession.
3. Weak curriculum development capability. This may need the assistance of JUSMAG or foreign schools. The present curriculum for CIC course is still designed to man World War II vintage ships.
4. In-efficient attrition system. Brilliant and skillful PN personnel are the ones pirated by private maritime companies while lower quality personnel are the ones left in the naval service.
5. Some officers who graduated in foreign schools are not qualified to teach.
6. Training aids and near-real life simulators for modern warfare are non-existent.
7. GHQ recruitment system is not responsive to skill requirement of the Philippine Navy.
8. Courses for modern warfare is non-existent.

9. In-efficient personnel monitoring system. The office of the Assistant Chief of Naval Staff for personnel (N-1), do not even have a list of officers who have taken foreign schooling.
10. Majority of both officers and enlisted men have no fundamental knowledge in modern warfare. Instructors have to practically start from square one, which may take longer schooling.

### **Opportunities**

1. AFP Modernization Program per RA 7898 was already approved by Congress. Political will is already in place.
2. Visiting Forces Agreement was also approved. Bilateral exercises will enhance or probably modernize knowledge and skill of our officers and enlisted men. It revitalizes the provisions of Mutual Defense Treaty and Mutual Defense Agreement. Hence, it could be used as leverage in acquiring modern naval simulators and training ships.
3. Good relationship with the United States and Australia gives us opportunity to send officers and enlisted men to undergo training at their schools free-of-charge.
4. Legislation pertaining to training and personnel management must be pursued in order to institutionalize the existing rules and regulations. Once it is legislated, it could no longer be subjected to the whims and caprices of naval leaders.

5. Recruitment to give priority to well-educated and skillful applicants. Educating them will be easy and would take lesser time.
6. Local schools and universities also conduct Navy related courses.
7. Naval courses are offered abroad. The Philippine Navy has wide-range of courses to choose from.
8. Technological advances on training aids and simulators may finally reach or acquired by PN training institutions.
9. Cross-training with other modernized navies gives us an enormous advantage while they don't get anything from us except goodwill and friendship.

### **Threats**

1. Present economic crisis may further delay the AFP Modernization Program. Acquisition of modern training aids and simulators will surely be affected being at the bottom of AFP priorities.
2. Higher pay and better career opportunities outside the Philippine Navy for talented personnel. The lure of lucrative jobs abroad forced many officers and enlisted men to resign or retire early after completing one re-enlistment contract to the detriment of the naval service.
3. The prevalence of poverty among the majority of our people may lead to budgetary cut of the AFP and give priority to activities that would give economic upliftment of poor Filipinos.
4. The indifference and negative attitude of some navy leaders that do not give importance on the value of education and training.

5. The intensification of insurgency and the resurgence of the separatist movement may divert again the focus of our leaders as well as the necessary budget and deprive the Education and Training System of much needed attention.
6. Threats to the political stability of the Philippine government by ambitious politicians and probably AFP / PNP generals.

## **Part II: Result of Survey**

### **A. Presentation of Gathered Data and Its Analysis**

Navy officers with the rank of LTSG (Lieutenant Senior Grade - equivalent to Captain in the Army), were purposely targeted in the survey because they already possess enough experience in the Naval Service. Fifty-four (54) out of seventy (70) field-grades officers who were given questionnaires, wholeheartedly responded. Additionally, these officers are the ones who do most of the fighting aboardship because they are the ones who act as Combat Information Officer (CIC) officer, Anti-submarine Warfare (ASW) officer, Weapons officer, Operations officer, Communications officer, Officer of the Deck (OOD) or Officer on Watch (OOW), Gunnery officer, Engineering and Damage Control officer and other junior billets. From the questionnaire, profile of the respondents in terms of age, length of service and sea duty, are as follows:

Table 1  
Professional Profile of the Respondents

	Ranges	Average
1. Age	30 to 51 years old	40 years
2. Length of Service	9 to 30 years old	17 years
3. Length of Sea Duty	0 to 14 years old	5 years

*Analysis:* Ages of the respondent's ranges from 30 to 51 years with an average of 40 years old. Their length of military service ranges from 9 to 30 years with an average of 17 years military service. Likewise, their sea duty ranges from zero to 14 years with an average of 5 years sea duty. Due to this length of service most of them have already finished their junior shipboard billets or designation as required to all General Line Officers by the well-established career pattern in the Navy. Such billets arranged in a chronological order is indicated on the first column of table 2 below:

Table 2  
Last Billets or Designations Performed Aboardship by the Respondents

Answer	Frequency	Percentage
a. Commanding Officer	2	4 %
b. Executive Officer	3	6 %
c. Operations Officer	19	35 %
d. Eng'ring / Damage Control Officer	14	26 %
e. Deck and Gunnery Officer	8	15 %
f. Mess and Supply Officer	5	9 %
g. (No sea duty yet)	3	6 %
Number of respondents	54	100 %

**Note:** Designations a and b are considered senior billets while designations c to f are considered junior shipboard billets.

Since time immemorial, the navy have already a well established career path or ladder in which all general line officers have to pass through regardless of their source of commission or status in life. All officers have to start in the lowest or most junior billet of Mess and Supply Officer even if he is already a senior officer. Aboardship, designations prevails over rank, hence, an Ensign who is already an Operations Officer could direct a Lieutenant Senior Grade aboard the same ship performing the job of a Mess and Supply Officer. All Navy officers has to work his way up until he becomes a Commanding Officer after a minimum of seven years sea duty. (This career pattern is similar to that of the Ground Forces in which an officer has to start as Platoon Leader, then after a certain period, the same officer will be promoted to Company Commander then to Battalion Commander and so on with intervening staff duty in between those major positions).

One of the preliminary questions in the questionnaire is asking for the last billet or designation they have completed aboardship.

Analysis: Per Table 2, thirty-five percent (35 %) of the respondents already completed the billet of Operations officer while 26 % have also completed the job of Engineering and Damage Control Officer. It goes to show that 61 % of the respondents have followed the time-frame and the career path as required by the Navy. Some officers who have longer sea duty may have already performing senior billets like the five the respondents who answered in the questionnaire that they have already performed senior shipboard billet like Executive Officer and Commanding Officer. For those who

have finished only the Deck and Gunnery Officer or Mess and Supply Officer, they are already behind as far as their rank is concerned. For these late performers, there is already a danger that they will be directed by their juniors aboardship someday.

Majority of the respondents are presently undergoing the Naval Command and Staff Course at NETC while the others are performing staff duty in various navy shore units in Manila, Cavite and Zambales area.

Table 3  
Degree of Respondent's Knowledge About Modern Naval Warfare

Name of Equipment	E	K	FK	HR	NK
1. Noisemaker	0	5	8	4	37
2. Bathythermograph	1	1	4	10	38
3. Sonobouys	1	8	7	3	35
4. Degausing Device	2	5	7	8	32
5. Hedge Hog	1	3	3	11	36
6. Praire-masker	0	1	2	9	43
7. LINK System	1	4	3	6	41
8. MAD (detector)	0	4	11	5	36
9. Dept Charge	4	10	16	3	22
10. ETI (detector)	0	4	7	7	36
11. VDS (sonar)	2	4	13	6	30
12. P3-C Orion A/C	5	6	7	3	33
13. FLIR	4	5	9	4	31
14. ASROC	1	5	4	5	39
15. Chaff (decoy)	0	7	4	5	35
16. Dipping Sonar	1	6	8	6	33
17. CAP (aircraft)	2	6	14	5	27
18. Towed-array sonar	1	3	9	8	33
19. Homing Torpedo	0	8	11	6	29
20. Influence Mines	0	7	9	6	32
21. SAU Net	1	2	2	7	41
22. CERTSUB	2	1	1	6	43
23. Burst transmission	1	2	3	5	43
24. Mech. Sweep Gear	1	1	5	8	39
25. Hammer box	0	1	7	9	36
26. Approach corridors	0	1	4	8	40
27. V-phalanx Close-in W	0	3	8	4	38
28. Boogie	2	3	3	9	36
29. Grayhound	0	1	2	8	42
30. EMCON Policy	1	0	3	7	42
<b>Total of Frequencies</b>	<b>33</b>	<b>107</b>	<b>194</b>	<b>191</b>	<b>1, 078</b>
<b>Percentage</b>	<b>2 %</b>	<b>7 %</b>	<b>12 %</b>	<b>12 %</b>	<b>67 %</b>

**Legend:** E = Expert - respondent knew and had actually experienced the use of such equipment.  
K = Knowledgeable – respondent knew the equipment and how it is used and operates.  
FK = Fairly Knows – respondent knew the equipment but does not know how it is used.  
HR = Hardly Remembers – respondent hardly knows both the equipment and its uses.  
NK = No Knowledge – respondent does not know anything about the equipment.

*Analysis:* Table number 3 above shows the dismal state of knowledge of our middle grade officers despite their broad experience and lengthy exposure at sea. Sixty-seven percent (67 %) acknowledge that they don't know anything about modern naval warfare. Twelve percent (12 %) hardly remembers and the same number 12 % fairly knows those listed equipment. Seven percent (7 %) said they are knowledgeable while only two percent (2 %) classified themselves as an expert in modern naval warfare.

The words or names of equipment listed at the left column of Table 3 are the basic words and equipment used or encountered from time to time while learning the fundamentals and general knowledge on the different aspects of naval warfare such as Anti-submarine Warfare, Anti-air Warfare, Surface Warfare and Mine Warfare. If those words and basic equipment are alien to these officers, the author believe that the more they would be ignorant on the specialized stage of those different naval warfare. Of course they could not be blamed on their present predicament because it was all the fault of the previous navy leadership for the past two and a half decades.

Only 2 % of the 54 respondents classified themselves as expert while 7 % considered themselves as knowledgeable. Analyzing their background through military courses as indicated in the questionnaire, these two groups of respondents, had undertaken schooling abroad. Another reason is that some equipment listed were available in the Naval Ordnance Depot in Naval Station Sangley, Cavite City. The respondents could probably have seen those items in training films.

Table 4  
Military Career Courses Taken by the Respondents

Military Courses	Number of Respondents That took the course	
1. Naval Officers Qualification Course (NOQC)	54	100%
4. OOD / OOW Package Course	18	33%
2. Marine Basic Officers Course (MBOC)	17	31%
5. Engineering / Damage Control Course	14	26%
7. Gunnery Officer Course	11	20%
3. Intelligence Officer Basic Course (IOBC)	10	19%
8. Depot Logistics Management Course	7	13%
9. Basic Special Warfare Course	5	9%
11. Operation Officer Package Course	4	7%
6. Basic Pilot Training	3	6%
10. SEAL / Explosive Ordnance Demolition	2	4%
12. Executive Officer Package Course	2	4%

**Note:** The respondents have taken 2 to 5 of the above listed courses.

*Analysis:* Military career courses taken by the respondents per Table 4 were mostly pre-entry and basic courses, which do not deal at all about modern naval warfare except for Naval Officers Qualification Course (NOQC). Inspection on the syllabus of the present NOQC curriculum revealed that general concepts of naval warfare are taught for only for few hours under the naval operation module.

Such knowledge if not put into actual practice during their shipboard assignments or even during fleet exercises, will surely be forgotten as years passed by. This explains their answers on the survey questionnaires.

The Package Courses listed in Table 4, which has an average duration of one to three months are conducted purposely to prepare officers to perform his next billet or designation. These courses are very much necessary specially for those who had stayed too long in shore assignments and might have forgotten the details and rudiments of such designation.

Table 5  
Professional Profile of the Respondents by Source of Commission

Source of Commission	Number
1. Graduates of Phil. Military Academy (NOQC "A")	20
2. Advance ROTC Graduates (NOQC "B")	14
3. Probationary Training Graduates (NOQC "C")	20
Total Respondents	54

Analysis: The different kinds of NOQC (Naval Officers Qualification Course) as indicated per Table 5 above, generally shows the kind of product or navy officer he is per comments of many shipboard Commanding Officers during the numerous command conferences that the author had attended when he was also a shipboard Commanding Officer from 05 May 1986 to August 1988. Additionally, through the years, many senior officers has been commenting that graduates of NOQC "C" fared or performed better aboardship because of the kind of training they had passed through. The course has a mortality rate of 40% due to its rigid military training and compressed academics. Students of both NOQC "A" and "B" usually go it easy or stay relax during their schooling because they knew they will no longer be kick out of the

service for reason that they are already CAD (Called to Active Service). This was quite proven when the author was assigned at the defunct Naval Training Command (NTC) in Fort San Felipe, Cavite City from January 1984 to May 1986. While at NTC, he taught Naval Operations Subjects to all kinds of NOQC students and found out how relax they (NOQC “A” and “B” students) really are.

There were five questions given in the questionnaire, which seeks to know the present status or effectiveness of the Philippine Navy doctrines on education and training.

Table 6  
Survey Regarding PN Doctrine

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree that the present education and training doctrine of the Philippine Navy should be primarily geared toward external defense?		
Answers	Frequency	Percentage
a. Strongly agree	14	26 %
b. Moderately agree	26	48 %
c. Slightly agree	9	17 %
d. Moderately not agree	4	7 %
e. Strongly not agree	1	2 %
Total respondents	54	100 %

Analysis: Table 6 above indicates that 49 out of 54 respondents (or 90%), agrees in varying degrees that the present education and training doctrine of the Philippine Navy should be geared towards external defense.

Table 7  
Start of Training on Modern Naval Warfare

<b>Question:</b> Do you agree that the PN personnel should undergo training in modern naval warfare even before the start of acquiring modern ships?		
Answers	Frequency	Percentage
a. Strongly agree	37	69 %
b. Moderately agree	15	27 %
c. Slightly agree	2	4 %
d. Moderately not agree	0	0 %
e. Strongly not agree	0	0 %
Total respondents	54	100 %

Analysis: In table 7 above, all of the 54 respondents (or 100%) agreed in varying degrees that PN personnel should undergo training in modern naval warfare even before the start of acquiring modern navy ships. Using the Likert Scale formula and if we generalize the answers of the respondents, it falls under the category of *strongly agree*. The respondents apparently realized the importance of knowledge and skill in modern warfare in relation to the credibility and the ability of the Philippine Navy to protect the national interests within our territorial waters and the EEZ.

Table 8  
Responsiveness of Present PN Training Doctrines

<b>Question:</b> On the whole, do you believe that the present training doctrines of the Philippine Navy is responsive to its mission of “providing prompt and sustained naval operation?”		
Answers	Frequency	Percentage
a. Very responsive	2	4 %
b. Moderately responsive	28	52 %
c. Slightly responsive	15	28%
d. Moderately not responsive	6	11 %
e. Strongly not responsive	3	5 %
Total respondents	54	100 %

Analysis: Table 8 above gave a general average of **moderately responsive**. This means that majority of the respondents are convinced that the present training doctrines of the Philippine navy is responsive to its mission of “providing prompt and sustained naval operation.” This is quite understandable because PN doctrines are oftentimes stated in a nicely worded generic terms, which could easily be adapted in any degree of modern warfare. But in the absence of amplifying and implementing doctrines that deals more on specific modern naval warfare, the stated mission will surely not be accomplished. With the level of knowledge on modern warfare by the respondents as reflected by their answers per table 3, the author will not be surprised if they are convinced of the nicely worded generic doctrine. Analyzing the records of the few respondents that answered in the negative way, they were the ones who have undergone schooling abroad. Therefore,

they fully understand what modern naval warfare is all about and they know the inadequacy and irrelevance of our World War II vintage doctrines and armaments.

Table 9

Sufficiency of Present Training Doctrines for Existing Floating Assets

<b>Question:</b> Do you believe that the present training doctrines of the Philippine Navy is sufficient for its existing floating assets?				
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale	
a. Very sufficient	7 %	4	X	5 = 20
b. Moderately sufficient	26 %	14	X	4 = 56
c. Slightly sufficient	33 %	18	X	3 = 54
d. Moderately insufficient	28 %	15	X	2 = 30
e. Very insufficient	5 %	3	X	1 = 3
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.02)	163

Analysis: The general average obtained from table 9 is 3.02 or **moderately sufficient**. It is almost equivalent to the mean value of 3.00. The assessment of the respondents was quite accurate because many of our present doctrines are compatible with the existing floating assets. The respondents were exposed to these kinds of doctrines and floating assets. When these doctrines were put into practice, however, it was applicable only for internal defense and peacetime law enforcement.

Table 10  
Usefulness of PN Training Doctrines to Cope-up with Modern Warfare

<b>Question:</b> Do you believe that the present training doctrines of the PN is useful to cope up with modern external warfare?			
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale
1. Strongly useful	11 %	6	X 5 = 30
2. Moderately useful	30 %	16	X 4 = 64
3. Slightly useful	28 %	15	X 3 = 45
4. Moderately not useful	22 %	12	X 2 = 24
5. Strongly not useful	9 %	5	X 1 = 5
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.11) 168

Analysis: Majority of the respondents were quite right in answering above question with **moderately useful**. The present training doctrines of the PN is indeed useful to cope up with modern external warfare because it is stated in generic sense. The fault lies on the training programs, curriculum, facilities, training aids and the qualifications of the instructors, which were all designed to operate and maintained World War II vintage ships.

Table 11  
Survey About Facilities and Training Programs

<b>Question:</b> Do you believe that training programs / facilities at NETC and FORTEG are sufficient to meet the requirements of the Philippine Navy?	
1. <b>YES</b>	= 15 respondents or <b>28 percent</b>
2. <b>NO</b>	= 39 respondents or <b>72 percent</b>
Total respondents = 54	

Analysis: Table 11 clearly indicates that training programs at NETC (Naval Education and Training Command) and FORTEG (Fleet Operational Readiness Training and Evaluation Group) are **not sufficient** to meet the requirements of the Philippine Navy because 39 out of 54 respondents or 72% answered NO to the question. The general perception of the respondents is extremely accurate. This result could be attested by the following:

a. Inefficiency were probably caused by ignorance of both our officers and enlisted men as earlier observed and explained in Chapter One specifically on Figure 1 showing the maritime incidents involving PN ships. Those incidents were caused mainly by human error, which means lack of skill. Seamanship and navigation are the most basic subjects for all seagoing officers be it a naval officer or officers of the merchant fleet.

b. The recent dismal results of Promotional Examinations among enlisted men whose annual passing rate is only 7 % reflects the kind and level of skill that our enlisted men possess now. Examinations given to them are all about their chosen profession, which they perform almost every day.

c. The deteriorating efficiency of Petty Officers on shipboard management and administration earlier discussed in the Background of the Study in Chapter One of this paper.

d. Table 3 above is a concrete proof that PN training programs do not delve on modern naval warfare. Such seemingly complete ignorance of PN officers on the different aspects of naval warfare is corroborated by their desire to know as reflected on their recommendations per next Table 12.

Table 12  
Training Programs for the PN Recommended by the Respondents

<b>Question:</b> If your answer were NO, what types of training programs would you recommend for the Philippine Navy?		
Courses and Training Programs	Frequencies	Percentage
1. Upgrade PN Training Aids and Laboratories	16	30 %
2. Acquire near real-life modern simulators	15	28 %
3. Revise Curriculum and Training Doctrines	12	22 %
4. Modern Warfare Training Programs / Courses	10	19 %
5. Fleet-Marine Tandem be Emphasized	8	15 %
6. OJT Aboard Modern Ships	8	15 %
7. Practicum / Exercises Aboard Training Ships	7	13 %
8. Combat Information Center (CIC) Course	6	11 %
9. Form a Pool of Qualified Instructors	5	9 %
10. Anti-submarine Warfare Course	5	9 %
11. Introduce Missile System Course	4	7 %
12. Electronic Warfare Course	3	5 %
13. Special Warfare Operation Course	3	5 %
14. Correspondence and Internet Schooling	2	4 %
15. Electronics and Information Technology	2	4 %
16. Mine Warfare Course	1	2 %

**Note:** The respondents recommended two or more courses or programs.

*Analysis:* The above training programs and courses as recommended by the respondents is similar to what the author has in mind except that it does not jibe with the order of priorities. Three of the above recommendations such as CIC Course, SWO Course, Practicum and Exercises aboardship are already existing programs, however, the Curriculum are not yet updated. The

PN is still using the same curriculum taken by the undersigned 25 years ago, which is suited only for World War II vintage ships.

Table 13  
Survey About Seeing a Modern CIC Trainer

<b>Question:</b> Do you have any knowledge or have you seen a modern CIC trainer equipped with Naval Tactical Data System in operation?	
a. <b>YES</b>	= 10 respondents or <b>19 percent</b>
b. <b>NO</b>	= 44 respondents or <b>81 percent</b>

Total number of respondents = 54

Analysis: Per Table 13, the result of survey was believable, understandable, unimaginable, alarming and deplorable. It is understandable because the Philippine Navy does not have any kind of CIC trainer, but 81% is so unexpectedly high. Could you just imagine a group of officers whose security and defense of the state is highly dependent on, have not seen yet a very basic but extremely important equipment. This state of affairs could be likened to that of an ordinary foot soldier who is armed only with revolvers and pistols but have not seen yet an Armalite rifle.

CIC (Combat Information Center) is the brain and nerve center of any fighting Navy ship. It is the most sensitive part of the ship because all data gathered by all sensors such as radar, sonar, electronic countermeasures, identification friend or foe (IFF) and other electronic sensors, are gathered together, integrated, evaluated electronically and displayed in a big console inside the CIC room. The big console displays the whole picture of the

operational area showing live the positions of all enemy and friendly ships, aircraft and submarines in real time. The console could also display incoming missiles and torpedoes.

Any navy officer who has no knowledge in CIC could be considered a half-baked navy officer because CIC plays a very critical role not only in all aspect of naval warfare but in all kinds of naval operations. Even simple navigation and anchoring it needs the assistance of CIC. Now, if an officer does not know about CIC and its uses, the more that he does not know anything about those complicated naval warfare and operations.

Table 14  
Number of Respondents Who Have Seen a CIC Trainer

<b>Question:</b> If your answer is yes, were you able to have hands-on training with this equipment?
a. <b>YES</b> = 1 or <b>2 percent</b> of the 54 respondents
b. <b>NO</b> = 9 or <b>17 percent</b> of the 54 respondents
<b>Note:</b> The other 81% are those who answered NO in Table 13.

Analysis: Based on the results of Table 13 and 14 above, it shows that only one was able to see and able to have a hands-on training inside a CIC while ten others were just able to see it. Knowledge of those who has able to see will be on a varying degree. For those who have not undergone formal instruction on CIC course or modern equipment, its definite, they have not learned anything. In fact, they even might have been confused because understanding of CIC requires a lot of background and pre-requisite knowledge.

Table 15  
Sufficiency of Naval Training Simulators in the Country

<b>Question:</b> Are the existing naval training simulators available in the country sufficient for the training requirement of the Philippine Navy?						
Answers	Frequency	Likert Scale			Percentage	
a. Very sufficient	1	X	5	=	5	2 %
b. Moderately sufficient	8	X	4	=	32	15 %
c. Slightly sufficient	18	X	3	=	54	33 %
d. Moderately insufficient	16	X	2	=	32	30 %
e. Very insufficient	10	X	1	=	10	19 %
Total respondents	54	(Ave. = 2.46)			133	100 %

*Analysis:* Average result per Table 15 is 2.46. It shows that naval training simulators in the country are ***moderately insufficient*** to meet the training requirement of the Philippine Navy. However, it would have been more accurate if the result was *very insufficient* because present Navy simulators do not train students about modern warfare. Most of these simulators available in the country are purely designed to train the basics of navigation, ships handling, damage control and engineering. They don't train ships crew how to fight an enemy ship, aircraft and submarine. These kind of simulators are also available in most civilian maritime schools because simulators are required by the DECS and the Philippine Coast Guard before these schools are accredited or given licensed to operate. Even the mock-ups for Naval Gunfire Support (NGFS) and Replenishment at Sea (RAS) that we used during our training 25 years ago were already gone and never replaced.

Table 16  
 Responsiveness of Present Curriculum Towards Modernization

<b>Question:</b> How do you rate the responsiveness of the curriculum (POI) of courses you have taken as to the requirements of the Navy for modernization?			
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale
a. Very responsive	7 %	4	X 5 = 20
b. Moderately responsive	30 %	16	X 4 = 64
c. Slightly responsive	33 %	18	X 3 = 54
d. Moderately not responsive	22 %	12	X 2 = 24
e. Strongly not responsive	7 %	4	X 1 = 4
Total respondents / Average	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.07) 166

*Analysis:* The result of survey clearly indicates that the curriculum of courses they have taken are ***moderately responsive*** to the requirements of the Navy for modernization. The author after examining the present curriculum, he prefers to rate it as *strongly not responsive* because it does not deal at all about modern warfare. The answers of the respondents are quite understandable because they seem not to know how far the PN is behind in terms of technology, knowledge, skills, sensors and armaments. Scrutinizing the four respondents who answered “strongly not responsive”, they were the ones who have undergone schooling abroad or have experienced fleet exercises aboard foreign modern Navy ships that gave them clear insights on what modern warfare is all about. This observation could also be confirmed by the result on table 3 indicating therein how ignorant they are about modern warfare.

Table 17  
Qualifications of Instructors Towards Modernization

<b>Question:</b> How do you rate the overall qualifications of the instructors or corps of professors in relation to AFP Modernization Program?				
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale	
a. Very much qualified	6 %	3	X 5 =	15
b. Moderately qualified	46 %	25	X 4 =	100
c. Slightly qualified	35 %	19	X 3 =	57
d. Moderately not qualified	9 %	5	X 2 =	10
e. Strongly not qualified	4 %	2	X 1 =	2
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.41)	184

Analysis: The assessment of the respondents giving the instructors a rating of “**moderately qualified**” per Table 17 is very accurate. The author fully agrees with the respondents. Most of these instructors are graduates of courses abroad. The author himself was assigned at NETC immediately after he graduated from the US in compliance with AFP Personnel Directive No. 1 dated 04 April 1995.

Table 18  
Sufficiency of Facilities Towards Modernization

<b>Question:</b> Do you believe that the present training facilities of the Navy are sufficiently in accordance with its training objectives towards modernization?				
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale	
a. Very strongly believe	6 %	3	X 5 =	15
b. Moderately believe	26 %	14	X 4 =	56
c. Slightly believe	41 %	22	X 3 =	66
d. Moderately do not believe	18 %	9	X 2 =	18
e. Strongly do not believe	13 %	7	X 1 =	7
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.00)	162

Analysis: Respondents **slightly believes** that the present training facilities of Philippine Navy is sufficient in accordance with the training objectives towards modernization as manifested on the result of the survey per Table 18 above. Again, this is a result of ignorance of the respondents about modern warfare. For some respondents who understand what modern warfare is all about, they answered the phrase “strongly do not believe”. The author who is a teacher by profession with six years experience as a trainor and instructor, firmly contradicts the general perception of the respondents.

Table 19  
Number of Times the Respondents Experienced Fleet Exercises

<b>Question:</b> How many times have you experienced actual fleet exercises consisting of two or more ships?												
No. of Times Experienced	0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
Frequency	18	7	4	10	5	6	1	0	0	0	1	2
Percentage	33	13	8	19	9	11	2	0	0	0	2	4

Total number of respondents = 54

Analysis: Per Table 19 above, 18 out of the 54 respondents or 33% have no experience on actual fleet exercises. Of the 36 respondents who have experience in fleet exercise, they had an average of three exercises. Only three respondents have experienced 10 exercises or more. The author believes on the universal dictum of teachers and trainors alike that “experience is the best teacher” or “there is no substitute for experience”. The said dictum is probably enough to explain how important fleet exercises are.

Table 20  
Type of Fleet Exercises Experienced by the Respondents

<b>Question:</b> If the answer is yes, kindly check below the name or type of exercise?		
Type of Fleet Exercises	Freq'cy	Percentage
a. Gunnery Exercise (GUNEX)	26	48 %
b. Tactical Exercise (TACEX)	25	46 %
c. Passage Exercise (PASSEX)	23	43 %
d. Amphibious Exercise (AMPHIBEX)	12	22 %
e. Surface Action Group Exercise (SAGEX)	11	20 %
f. Anti-air Warfare (AAW) Exercise	8	15 %
g. Annual BALIKATAN Exercise (with US Navy)	5	9 %
h. CORPAT-PHILINDO Exercise (with Indonesia)	4	7 %
i. Maritime Surveillance Exercise (MARSURVEX)	2	4 %
j. MALPHI-LAUT Exercise (with Malaysian Navy)	2	4 %
k. AFP Landing Exercise (AFPLEX)	1	2 %
l. Anti-submarine Warfare Exercise (ASWEX)	1	2 %
m. Dagat-Singa Exercise (with Singaporean Navy)	1	2 %
n. Mine Warfare Exercise	0	0

**Note:** Many respondents checked more than one type of exercise

Analysis: It could be noted in Table 20 above that exercises, which are suited only for World War II vintage ships were the ones that were repeatedly conducted. And they are as follows: Gunnery, TACEX, PASSEX and Amphibious exercises. This type of exercises are designed only to meet internal threats for simple reasons that they are using the same old ships whose guns are manually loaded and projectiles could not even reach the horizon. Anti-air warfare exercise indicated above got a surprising sixth place.

Obviously, the respondents were referring to a simulated AAW exercise using World War II vintage guns. It could be a simulated one because the author has not heard of any drone or target towed by an aircraft.

Table 21

Respondents Who Experienced Exercises Aboard Foreign Navy Ships

<b>Question:</b> Have you experienced naval exercises aboard foreign Navy ships?
a. <b>YES</b> = 18 or <b>33 percent</b> of the 54 respondents
b. <b>NO</b> = 36 or <b>67 percent</b> of the 54 respondents

Analysis: Only one-third of the respondents have experienced exercises aboard foreign Navy ships as indicated in Table 21 above. This kind of experience is very important for our navy officers because our ships do not have modern sensors and armaments. However, the same experience sometimes proved useless because for those who have not undergone formal schooling on modern naval warfare, they don't understand how those modern equipment works. This was what the author had personally experienced when he was designated as Task Group Commander of RP-US bilateral exercise dubbed "CARAT '95". PN officers who were deployed aboard US navy ships admitted to him that many of them have not learned anything despite the guided tour and briefing of their American counterpart. Had this guided tour, been preceded by a formal schooling on modern naval warfare, those officers could have learned something from the Americans.

CARAT ‘95 exercise with the US Navy lasted for only two days. Knowledge gained by the PN officers and enlisted men deployed aboard US navy ships could be limited only to what they have seen and observed. As far as critical thinking on how those equipment operates; what they are used for; when and why and so on, definitely, they have not learned.

Table 22  
Comparing the Value and Quality of Experience

<b>Question:</b> How do you compare the value and quality of experience you have gained from fleet experience having foreign participating forces with purely local fleet?			
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale
a. Very valuable	24 %	13	X 5 = 65
b. Moderately valuable	33 %	18	X 4 = 72
c. Slightly valuable	24 %	13	X 3 = 39
d. Moderately not valuable	4 %	2	X 2 = 4
e. Strongly not valuable	5 %	3	X 1 = 3
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.39) 183

Analysis: The average attained per Table 22 was 3.39, which is equivalent to **moderately valuable**. The respondents realized the importance of actual experience on fleet exercise with foreign Navy ships participating. For a Navy that do not have modern ships nor simulators, the only way to learn modern weapons, sensors, machineries, equipment and procedures is through OJT or naval exercise with foreign navy.

Table 23  
OJT or Practicum as Application for Knowledge Gained

<b>Question:</b> Were you satisfied of the OJT or practicum that you have encountered in applying your knowledge gained as part of training programs?				
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale	
a. Very satisfactory	5 %	3	X	5 = 15
b. Moderately satisfactory	39 %	21	X	4 = 84
c. Slightly satisfactory	39 %	21	X	3 = 63
d. Moderately not satisfactory	15 %	8	X	2 = 16
e. Strongly not satisfactory	2 %	1	X	1 = 1
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.32) 179	

Analysis: Survey result of “**moderately satisfactory**” per Table 23 truly reflects the practical side or OJT of the PN Education and Training System. Practical side of most curricula today is less than ten percent. Some are even purely theoretical and let the students have their practical when they report back to their mother unit aboardship. Reason behind this is that PN training institutions don’t have enough laboratories, mock-ups, simulators and training ships wherein they could apply what they have learned inside the classrooms.

Table 24  
Relevance of Job Assignments Compared to Knowledge Gained

<b>Question:</b> How relevant were the knowledge and skill you have gained from Philippine Navy training programs compared to your actual job assignments?				
Answers	Percentage	Frequency	Likert scale	
a. Very relevant	20 %	11	X	5 = 55
b. Moderately relevant	39 %	21	X	4 = 84
c. Slightly relevant	33 %	18	X	3 = 54
d. Moderately not relevant	4 %	2	X	2 = 4
e. Strongly not relevant	4 %	2	X	1 = 1
Total respondents	100 %	54	(Ave. = 3.67)	198

Analysis: The resulting average of 3.67 falls under “**moderately relevant**” per Table 24 above, is far below than what the author has expected. It should have been “very relevant” because most schooling in the PN are being conducted to prepare both officers and enlisted men to assume a certain job in such a way that immediately after graduation, they are assigned to different PN units and practice what they have learned.

**Part III : Strategy and Development of Doctrines**

**A. Strategy and Direction on Human Resource Development. -**

Under the proposed Human Resource Development Plan that is still being formulated at the office of N-5, the general strategy is “To Recruit, Train, Develop and Retain Quality Personnel”. Plan of action of this strategy covers 10 areas. They are follows:

a. Procurement: - Recruitment base will be widen. Regional recruitment will correspond to the skills and rating requirement of the PN. Services for the tri-media coverage will be utilized.

b. Training: - To enhance training, following activities are schedule to be conducted: Training development and capabilities will be strengthen. Specialization for the officers to push through. Periodic upgrading of skills will be conducted. Outstanding graduates will be assigned to instructor / training duty. Performance validation system will be established. Qualified civilian employees have to assume staff positions in the organization in the future. Necessary equipage and training on information and communications technology might be acquired. Linkages with government organizations and non-government organizations concerned will be institutionalized.

c. Career Management: - Plans for this aspect are as follows: Create Personnel Data Base, which will be called PN Human Resource Information System; train personnel officers; and then review / validate Field of Specialization (FOS).

d. Retirement: - Provide early attrition package; assist create Data Base; strengthen performance-evaluation system.

e. Promotion: - Review / validate promotion policies; establish Testing Centers; enhance library capabilities; and provide review materials.

f. Remuneration: - Provide appropriate incentives and rewards; review / validate remuneration policies; and establish standards of qualifications and risk level.

g. Physical and Mental Fitness: - Develop and implement physical fitness and mental health programs. Develop and implement sports program.

h. Cultural Values: - Integrate desired culture / values in training programs.

i. Reservist: - Integrate Philippine Navy Affiliated Reserved Units (PNARUS) to PN regular force training. Conduct mobilization / assembly test.

k. Environment: - Develop curriculum for environment protection training. Get involved in joint civilian-military community based projects.

l. Peace-keeping Operations: - Develop curriculum for peace-keeping operations. Establish linkages with concerned government agencies and UN bodies concerned for peace keeping related operations.

The proposed HRD plan also intends to address following issues and concerns affecting the PN personnel as a whole.

- 1) Uplifting the quality of life of PN personnel.
- 2) Upgrading the quality of leadership of officers.
- 3) Raising the low level of pay and allowances.
- 4) Attend to “on-base / off-base housing”.
- 5) Upgrade recreational / health care facilities.
- 6) Stress organizational commitment innovation and accountability.
- 7) Improve the low level readiness of sailors.

- 8) Enhance recruitment process and selection of applicants.
- 9) Appropriateness and relevance of PN Education and Training System.
- 10) Plan for job placement for separated personnel.
- 12) Implementation of Human Resource Maintenance.
  - a) Physical Fitness
  - b) Quality of work place / life
  - c) Mental Health
- 13) Drug Prevention
- 14) Enhance benefit system
  - a) Pay and allowances
  - b) Scholarships for dependents.

History of the Navy tells us that more often than not, implementation of good plans are subjected to the whims and caprices on whoever is on the helm of Navy leadership. There was a period when the efforts of the command were concentrated on counter-insurgency or civil-military operations apparently aimed at pleasing the media and the political leadership. Non-military operations most of the time reaps immediate rewards from our people<sup>19</sup>. Unfortunately, such activities eats-up a big chunk of the PN meager budget and makes naval leaders to forget about shipboard training and fleet exercises. And there was also a period when a FOIC was so strict about

shipboard duty and the performance of the fleet because his philosophy is that “the navy exists because of the fleet”.

***B. Enhancement and Development of Doctrine: -***

As the title of this paper implies, the author intends to revise and improved the PN Education and Training Manual (PNM 10-1) as an output of his study. This manual was promulgated on 30 June 1994 by Vice Admiral Virgilio Q. Marcel AFP, who was then the incumbent Flag Officer-in-Command, Philippine Navy at that time. Analysis conducted on the manual revealed that it needs revision and improvement in order to be relevant and applicable to the Modernization Program. The specific areas of concern that needs revision are as follows:

a. Philosophy, vision and objectives: - More specifics must be added to the present concept and definitions, which are so generic in nature. Accomplishment of mission against external aggression; modernizing both the skills and equipage should always be specifically mentioned.

b. Training Facilities – A lot of changes is needed to modernize the knowledge of PN personnel. A school that would cater to modern naval warfare courses has to be established at NETC. It could be named Naval Warfare School. Similarly, a Fleet Trainer should be constructed in Cavite City to cater to ships undergoing repairs at Naval Shipyard.

c. Training Aids – Modern near-real life simulators must be given priority for procurement especially CIC and Fleet Trainer. Laboratories and

mock-ups for engineering, seamanship, navigation and related shipboard jobs should likewise be given priority. Without these items, only theoretical knowledge will be acquired and no skill. The worst ill-effect of training without training aids is its short retentivity or short memory on the part of the learner. Students easily forget what they learned if they did not practice what they learned even on simulators.

d. POIs and Curriculum – Numerous curriculum has to be revised. At least 50% of the syllabus must be dealing with modern warfare, weapons, sensors, machineries and equipment.

e. Instructors – The most important factor in the teaching and learning situation. All graduates of foreign schools must be pooled together to form the initial core of qualified instructors. All of them must undergo instructor course. No matter how modern or sophisticated the training aids and facilities are, if the instructor is not qualified, they will all be rendered useless.

## **Chapter 5**

### **SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

#### **A. Summary of Findings.**

##### **1. On the Aspect of the Respondents**

As reflected in Table 3, sixty-seven percent (67 %) of the respondents acknowledge through their own assessment that they don't know anything about modern naval warfare. Those who classified themselves "hardly remembers" or "fairly knows" garnered twelve percent (12 %) each. Seven percent (7 %) implied that they are "knowledgeable" of naval warfare and only two percent claimed that they are "expert" on those equipment listed.

##### **2. On the aspect of Training Doctrine:**

a. Military career courses taken by the respondents as reflected in Table 4 and documents gathered from the Naval Education and Training Command (NETC) and Fleet Operational Training and Evaluation Group (FORTEG) were all basic courses and does not teaches about modern warfare. Those courses are required before they could join the Navy or proceed to their chosen field of naval profession.

b. Seventy-four percent (74%) of the respondents agreed that the present PN education and training doctrine should be geared towards external defense (per Table 6).

c. Ninety-six percent (96%) agreed that PN personnel should undergo training in naval warfare even before the start of acquiring modern ships (Table 7).

d. On the whole, 55% or 30 out of 54 respondents agreed that the present PN training doctrine is responsive to its mission of “providing prompt and sustained naval operation” (Table 8).

e. Only 18 of the 54 respondents or 33% believes that the present training doctrines of the PN is sufficient for its present existing floating assets (Table 9).

f. Usefulness of PN Training Doctrines to cope up with modern warfare was the belief of the 22 respondents or 41% (Table 10).

### **3. On the aspect of training aids and facilities:**

a. Forty-four out of the 54 respondents or 81% have not seen yet a modern CIC trainer equipped with Naval Tactical Data Systems (NTDS) in operation (Table 13).

b. Only one or 2% of the 54 respondents was able to have actual hands-on training with modern CIC trainer (Table 14).

c. Only nine or 17% of the 54 respondents believes that naval training simulators in the country are sufficient to meet the training requirements of the Philippine Navy (Table 15).

d. Seventeen or 31% of the respondents believed that the present facilities of the Navy are sufficiently in accordance with its training objectives towards modernization (Table 18).

#### **4. On the aspect of Training Programs and Curriculum:**

a. Thirty-seven percent (37%) or 20 of the 54 respondents rated the present curriculum as responsive towards modernization (Table 16).

b. Seventy-two percent (72%) or 39 out of 54 respondents believed that training programs at NETC and FORTEG are not sufficient to meet the requirements of the Philippine Navy (Table 11).

c. The top five (5) courses and training programs recommended by the respondents are reflective of the clamor of our middle-grade officers for modernization (Table 12). They are listed below in chronological order:

1) Upgrading of PN training aids and laboratories (recommended by 16 respondents).

2) Acquisition of near-real life simulators (recommended by 15 respondents).

3) Revision of curriculum, Program of Instructions (POI) and training doctrines (recommended by 12 respondents).

4) Conduct of modern warfare training programs and courses (recommended by 10 respondents).

**5)** Emphasis on Fleet-Marine tandem and OJT aboard modern ships (both recommended by 8 respondents).

## **5. On the Aspect of the Instructors:**

Qualification of instructors towards modernization was given a rating of *moderately qualified* per Table 17. Twenty-eight (28) out of 54 respondents or 52% gave the said rating.

### **B. Conclusions.**

The data provided by the respondents were so reliable and even exceeded our expectations of confirming our earlier assumptions and predictions regarding the status of Education and Training System in the Philippine Navy. Based on the findings presented, analyzed and interpreted in the preceding chapter, the following conclusions are as follows:

1. The present PN doctrines on education and training are still relatively relevant because they were stated in generic terms. More specifics are needed in order to address the modernization and external defense aspect.
2. Ninety-five percent (95%) of the PN middle grade officers do not have any knowledge about modern warfare.
3. Knowledge and skills of our middle-grade officers are not even adequate to efficiently operate the existing antiquated navy ships.
4. Training aids, programs and facilities of Philippine Navy training institutions are inadequate to facilitate the acquisition of knowledge and skills for modern warfare subjects.

5. Courses for modern warfare are non-existent in any training institutions of the Philippine Navy.

6. Curricula of courses presently being taught at PN training institutions are still designed to man and operate World War II vintage navy ships.

7. Instructors were rated moderately qualified.

8. Assignments, designations, practicum and on-the-job training are in accordance with the acquired knowledge and skill.

### **C. Recommendations**

1. Training doctrines, visions and objectives should be specified and re-oriented towards modernization and external defense. The PN Education and Training Manual attached herein as Annex E necessitates updating and revision.

2. Establish a Naval Warfare School that would purely cater to modern and more technical courses as enumerated below. The school must be equipped with near-real life modern simulators to provide quality knowledge and skills in modern naval warfare. In this connection, there should be representation with the US government on how we can possibly acquire through lease or other means one relatively modern ship mothballed at San Diego Harbor, California to be used purely as Training ship.

3. Create a Curriculum Development Board (CDB) whose members are graduates of modern warfare courses taken abroad. These members should work on full time basis to be stationed at NETC, San Antonio, Zambales with an objective of formulating new doctrines, curriculum, training programs and design training aids, mock-ups and facilities. Combat Information Center (CIC) Course must be required to all general line officers for them to know how the ship fights in modern warfare and the following Naval courses that teaches the generic and fundamental concepts of modern naval warfare be introduced now at NETC:

- |                           |                          |
|---------------------------|--------------------------|
| a. Anti-submarine Warfare | e. Amphibious Operations |
| b. Surface Warfare        | f. Electronic Warfare    |
| c. Anti-air Warfare       | g. Naval Special Warfare |
| d. Mine Warfare           | h. Submarine Warfare     |

4. Pool of qualified instructors whose initial core group are members of the Curriculum Development Board must be maintained and given incentives such as Instructors Duty Pay whether they have teaching load or not. Additionally, they shall have priority on Faculty Enhancement Program and schooling abroad.

5. Professional Competitive Examination should be conducted every six months among navy officers from Captains down to Ensigns so that those officers whose skills and knowledge have deteriorated should be sent for re-

training in appropriate naval courses. In this connection, refresher Course must be conducted to all officers and enlisted men that will be involved or deployed aboard modern ships of foreign navies participating on a bilateral or multi-lateral fleet exercise. The course must be about the modern weapons, sensors, equipment and over-all capability of the ship that they are going to board.

## ENDNOTES

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- <sup>5</sup> Captain Mateo M. Mayuga PN(GSC), AFP Real State Office, CGEA, Quezon City.
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- <sup>19</sup> Captain Eduardo L. Tolentino PN(MNSA), "Critical Analysis of the RP Naval Capabilities", Masteral Thesis, NDCP, 1989, p. 253.

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<sup>19</sup>Captain E